To judge by the statements made by the president and secretary of state, U.S. Syria policy has shifted from supporting regime change to actively opposing it. Ari Heistein notes that this is testimony to Assad’s successful strategy of encouraging the expansion of Islamic State (IS) and then presenting himself as the only viable alternative to it. Some contend that leaving the Syrian dictator in power will bring benefits in the form of post-war stability. Heistein, however, argues that an Assad victory will bring no such thing:

[P]ost-war Assad will probably make pre-war Assad look like a dandy. If there is anything worse than a dictator who feels invincible, it is a dictator who is afraid of his own shadow. . . . [I]t is safe to assume that Assad will respond with extremely brutal force any time someone so much as mumbles a complaint.

The coherence of pro-regime forces, composed of numerous militias in addition to the Syrian Arab Army, is another major question mark. . . . [M]ilitias vaguely referred to as shabiha are more like criminal networks that have vested financial interests in the regime and serve as its enforcers. Will Assad’s tattered forces be able to control these armed groups once the war ends? . . . In 2013, a Syrian official predicted discord from within pro-regime militias saying, “After this crisis, there will be a 1,000 more crises—the militia leaders. Two years ago they went from nobody to somebody with guns and power. How can we tell these shabiha to go back to being a nobody again?” . . .

With such grim prospects for Assadistan, the regime hardly seems to be the choice for stability that its backers have framed it as. It is likely that the Syrian regime will deal ruthlessly with the instability caused by the dismal economic situation and the diffusion of weapons and power to local militias.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”