Germany Can’t Admit Where Anti-Semitism Comes from

According to a report recently released by Germany’s Ministry of the Interior, 92 percent of the anti-Semitic incidents in the country since January were the work of right-wing extremists. German authorities came to this conclusion because, by government fiat, any anti-Semitic crime is categorized as a “politically motivated right-wing extremist crime.” Evelyn Gordon explains why this approach is not only misleading but dangerous:

There are two good reasons for thinking the linguistic acrobatics, in this case, represent the rule rather than the exception. First, a 2014 study of 14,000 pieces of hate mail sent over a ten-year period to the Central Council of Jews in Germany and the Israeli embassy in Berlin found that only 3 percent came from far-right extremists. Over 60 percent came from the educated mainstream—professors, PhDs, lawyers, priests, [and] university and high-school students. And these letters were definitely anti-Semitic rather than merely anti-Israel; they included comments such as “It is possible that the murder of innocent children suits your long tradition?” . . .

[U]nless you want to make the dubious claim that Germany’s educated mainstream—unlike that of other Western countries—consists largely of far-right extremists, it’s clear that far-right extremists aren’t the only people actively committing anti-Semitic acts.

Second, in other Western European countries, Islamic extremists are a major source of anti-Semitic crime. Thus it’s hard to believe that Germany—which, as several terror attacks over the last two years have shown, is hardly devoid of such extremists—would be the one exception to this rule. . . .

Far-right anti-Semitism is, of course, real. But so are left-wing and Islamic anti-Semitism. And by pretending the latter two don’t exist, the German government has made it impossible to combat those types of anti-Semitism effectively, since you can’t fight something whose very existence you refuse to acknowledge.

Read more at Evelyn Gordon

More about: Anti-Semitism, European Islam, Germany, Politics & Current Affairs

 

To Save Gaza, the U.S. Needs a Strategy to Restrain Iran

Since the outbreak of war on October 7, America has given Israel much support, and also much advice. Seth Cropsey argues that some of that advice hasn’t been especially good:

American demands for “restraint” and a “lighter footprint” provide significant elements of Hamas’s command structure, including Yahya Sinwar, the architect of 10/7, a far greater chance of surviving and preserving the organization’s capabilities. Its threat will persist to some extent in any case, since it has significant assets in Lebanon and is poised to enter into a full-fledged partnership with Hizballah that would give it access to Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps for recruitment and to Iranian-supported ratlines into Jordan and Syria.

Turning to the aftermath of the war, Cropsey observes that it will take a different kind of involvement for the U.S. to get the outcomes it desires, namely an alternative to Israeli and to Hamas rule in Gaza that comes with buy-in from its Arab allies:

The only way that Gaza can be governed in a sustainable and stable manner is through the participation of Arab states, and in particular the Gulf Arabs, and the only power that can deliver their participation is the United States. A grand bargain is impossible unless the U.S. exerts enough leverage to induce one.

Militarily speaking, the U.S. has shown no desire seriously to curb Iranian power. It has persistently signaled a desire to avoid escalation. . . . The Gulf Arabs understand this. They have no desire to engage in serious strategic dialogue with Washington and Jerusalem over Iran strategy, since Washington does not have an Iran strategy.

Gaza’s fate is a small part of a much broader strategic struggle. Unless this is recognized, any diplomatic master plan will degenerate into a diplomatic parlor game.

Read more at National Review

More about: Gaza War 2023, Iran, U.S. Foreign policy