While cautioning against jettisoning the nuclear agreement with Tehran, John Allen and Michael O’Hanlon urge the U.S. to act more aggressively to contain the Islamic Republic, and outline some of the particulars:

[O]ver the last generation, no foreign government has more American blood on its hands than Iran’s post-1979 revolutionary theocracy. It orchestrated the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon in 1983 and the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996. In Iraq since 2003, Iran’s Quds Force has provided weaponry to both Sunni and Shiite insurgents who have killed hundreds of Americans. . . .

[A] security strategy to contain and challenge Iran regionally needs to include, [first], a pledge to maintain a U.S. military presence in Iraq for a longer period of time and extend the aid package for the country. . . . A stronger, more stable Iraq will be much better positioned to resist domination by Iran. . . .

[In Syria], the United States and like-minded states—as well as global aid agencies—need to help provide security and economic assistance to regions free of Bashar al-Assad’s rule as well as of Islamic State’s. Some of these regions should be treated as temporary autonomous zones and help govern themselves as well. Additionally, more Western and [Arab] military strength and support for moderate insurgents is needed in northwest parts of the country, such as in and around Idlib, where the al-Qaeda affiliate formerly known as Nusra Front is still active. Otherwise, either the latter group or Assad’s forces backed by Russia and Iran will be the likely victor.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.