The island nation of Bahrain is allied with the U.S. and Saudi Arabia; it is also a Shiite-majority country governed by a narrow Sunni elite. Through 2011, restive Shiites periodically rioted or engaged in low-grade terror: throwing Molotov cocktails and setting off bombs meant to frighten rather than to kill or maim. But since then, the armed opposition has grown more sophisticated, relying on small, harder to penetrate cells, carefully planned attacks, and far more sophisticated and deadly explosives. Michael Knights and Matthew Levitt see much evidence of support from Iran and Hizballah:

Since 2011, Iran and its proxy militias in Lebanon and Iraq have mounted an unprecedented effort to train, activate, and resupply cells ready to set off improvised explosive devices (IEDs) inside Bahrain. Following the military suppression of Arab Spring protests in Bahrain, a number of Shiite youths traveled abroad to receive Iranian training in camps and battlefronts in Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. Iran’s effort brought significant quantities of military high explosives into Bahrain and assisted Bahraini cells in developing workshops capable of churning out reliable, remote-controlled IEDs. Bahraini militants [also] have emerged as a smaller, tempered movement with better operational security.

Knights and Levitt suggest that Tehran may be waiting for general unrest, as during the 2011 Arab Spring, to activate the various cells it is cultivating in Bahrain—the same strategy it employed to foment and exploit chaos in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Or the plan could be to use Bahrain as a springboard to Saudi Arabia:

Located across a 25-kilometer causeway from Bahrain, the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia is a predominantly Shiite area that holds more than 20 percent of the world’s total proven oil reserves and serves as the center of the kingdom’s oil and petrochemicals industries. The Shiite population has become more restive in recent years. . . .

The [recent] increase in violence in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province is even more notable than in Bahrain. In 2014-2015, there were just four attacks on security forces, all shooting incidents that left a total of five officers dead and three wounded. In 2016-2017, the number of attacks jumped to 24, with 18 killed and 39 wounded, with an even balance of shootings and bomb attacks. The importation of IEDs from Bahrain may be one factor in this change. . . .

On November 10, 2017, Bahraini militants may have acted on their intent [to bring their operations to Saudi Arabia] by bombing a key pipeline . . . supplying Saudi Arabian crude to the Bahrain Petroleum Company refinery.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.