In a recent reversal, the United Kingdom outlawed Hizballah’s “political wing” from operating within its borders, after over a decade of considering only its “military wing” a terrorist organization. Yet, write Mark Dubowitz and Benjamin Weinthal, other European countries refuse to follow suit:

On Friday, the German government rebuffed requests from the U.S., Israel, and a number of Arab countries to outlaw all of Hizballah. Europe’s . . . approach to Hizballah puts it at odds with reality—not to mention Hizballah leaders’ own view of their group. . . . The partial ban prompted the Hizballah spokesman Ibrahim Mousawi to repeat what other top officials of the group have stressed over the years: “Hizballah is a single, large organization. We have no wings that are separate from one another.” . . .

But the EU, [along with Germany, has] continued to ignore Hizballah’s self-described identity as a unitary organization. The rationale: Europe, in particular France and Germany, desired to continue a “critical dialogue.”. . .

As the main economic engine of Europe, Germany could influence a change in EU policy toward Hizballah. [Moreover], Germany has long been a hotbed of Hizballah activity. The organization’s representatives raise funds, recruit members and spread a lethal anti-Semitic and jihadist ideology. . . .

The real reason Germany (and the EU) hesitate to ban the whole of Hizballah has to do with appeasing Iran, Hizballah’s sponsor. Berlin is well aware that Hizballah is tied at the navel to Tehran. . . . That treasured friendship was on display last month when German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier sent a warm congratulatory telegram to Tehran to honor the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Republic.

Two weeks ago, a terrorist—most likely working for Hizballah—managed to cross into Israel from Lebanon and plant an explosive device near Megiddo that wounded a civilian. The attack, according to Matthew Levitt, is a sign of the Iran-backed militia’s increasing willingness to challenge the tacit understanding it has had with the IDF for over a decade. Such renewed aggression can also be found in the rhetoric of the group’s leaders:

In the lead-up to the 2006 war, [Hizballah’s] Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah famously miscalculated how Israel would respond to the cross-border abduction of its soldiers. According to Israeli analysts, however, he now believes he can predict the enemy’s behavior more accurately, leading him to sharpen his rhetoric and approve a series of increasingly aggressive actions over the past three years.

Nasrallah’s willingness to risk conflict with Israel was partly driven by domestic economic and political pressures. . . . Yet he also seemed to believe that Israel was unlikely to respond in a serious way to his threats given Hizballah’s enlarged precision-missile arsenal and air-defense systems.

In addition to the bombing, this month has seen increased reports of cross-border harassment against Israelis, such as aiming laser beams at drivers and homes, setting off loud explosions on the Lebanese frontier, and pouring sewage toward Israeli towns. Hizballah has also disrupted Israeli efforts to reinforce the security barrier in several spots along the Blue Line, [which serves as the de-facto border between Lebanon and the Jewish state].

This creeping aggressiveness—coupled with Nasrallah’s sense of having deterred Israel and weakened its military posture—indicate that Hizballah will continue trying to move the goalposts.