Yesterday marked the 25th anniversary of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires by Hizballah, carried out in close cooperation with Iranian embassy staff, some of whom now hold high office in Tehran. Avi Weiss documents the Argentinian government’s efforts to conceal the truth about the bombing, which likely included the assassination in 2015 of Alberto Nisman, the special prosecutor investigating the case:

Carlos Menem, who was the country’s president [at the time of the bombing], did all he could to quiet the calls for justice with ever more falsehoods and denials of knowledge about who was to blame.

One year [after the attack], when I returned to Buenos Aires to . . . seek the truth and console my fellow Jews in their undying grief, I got a personal look at the cover-up. Menem’s minions tried to shut me up. And the person appointed to be a special prosecutor for the bombing, Juan José Galeano, subpoenaed me to his office, bullied me, and tried to intimidate me with thinly veiled threats if I didn’t stop looking into the matter on my own.

Nor did it end there. In 2013, another Argentine president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, tried to bury history by signing a memorandum of agreement with Iran to jointly investigate the bombing. . . . The very idea was as absurd as asking al-Qaeda to investigate the men who flew into the World Trade Center.

Menem and Kirchner are now senators in the Argentine government, a position that gives them immunity from prosecution. But who have they been protecting? Was Menem trying to cover up the role of neo-fascist and ultra-right-wing thugs he had placed in important intelligence and security positions? . . . Did Kirchner sign the memorandum of understanding with the Iranians in exchange for oil and trade? Is that why Argentina—to this day—shamefully maintains diplomatic relations with Iran?

Before exploding electronics in Lebanon seized the attention of the Israeli public, debate there had focused on the Philadelphi Corridor—the strip of land between Gaza and Egypt—and whether the IDF can afford to withdraw from it. Egypt has opposed Israeli control of the corridor, which is crucial to Hamas’s supply lines, and Egyptian objections likely prevented Israel from seizing it earlier in the war. Yet, argues Mariam Wahba, Egypt in the long run only stands to lose by letting Hamas use the corridor, and has proved incapable of effectively sealing it off:

Ultimately, this moment presents an opportunity for the United States to hold Egypt’s feet to the fire.

To press Cairo, the United States should consider conditioning future aid on Cairo’s willingness to cooperate. This should include a demand for greater transparency and independent oversight to verify Egyptian claims about the tunnels. Congress ought to hold hearings to understand better Egypt’s role and its compliance as a U.S. ally. Despite Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s nine trips to the Middle East since the start of the war, there has been little clarity on how Egypt intends to fulfill its role as a mediator.

By refusing to acknowledge Israel’s legitimate security concerns, Egypt is undermining its own interests, prolonging the war in Gaza, and further destabilizing its relationship with Jerusalem. It is time for Egyptian leaders either to admit their inability to secure the border and seek help from Israel and America, or to risk being perceived as enablers of Hamas and its terrorist campaign.