For several years, sharp criticism of the Palestinians and their leaders has been commonplace in the Egyptian press. Now, writes, Khaled Abu Toameh, similar attitudes can be found in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries as an increasing segment of their populations sees Palestinians as ungrateful for the financial and diplomatic support they have received from their Arab brethren:

In the past two years, Palestinians have burned Saudi flags and photographs of Muhammad bin Salman during demonstrations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Why? The crown prince is seen by Palestinians as being “too close” to Israel and the U.S. administration. Like the Egyptians, the Saudis feel betrayed by the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia for years has given the Palestinians billions of dollars in aid, but this has not stopped the Palestinians from bad-mouthing Saudi leaders at every turn.

The Saudis are now saying that they, too, are fed up. Their outrage reached its peak last June, when Palestinians assaulted a Saudi blogger visiting the al-Aqsa Mosque compound in the Old City of Jerusalem. The assailants spat in the blogger’s face and accused him of promoting “normalization” with Israel. . . . Other Saudis seem extremely unhappy with the Palestinians’ relations with Iran.

Many people in Arab countries are now saying that it is high time for the Palestinians to start looking after their own interests and thinking of a better future for their children. They no longer see the Palestinian issue as the main problem in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arabs seem to be saying to the Palestinians: “We want to march forward; you can continue to march backward for as long as you wish.”

On Yom Kippur, Hizballah fired over 200 rockets and drones at Israel, with one drone hitting a retirement home in Herzliya, miraculously without casualties. Yesterday, however, proved less lucky: a drone launched by the Iran-backed group struck a military base, killing four and injuring another 58, about twenty moderately or seriously.

This attack reflects Iranian strategy: Israeli defensive systems are strong, but so are Iranian drones and missiles, and with enough attacks some will get through. As Ariel Kahana writes, such an approach is consistent with Tehran’s desire to fight a war of attrition, denying Jerusalem the chance to strike a decisive blow. Kahana explains how the IDF might turn the tables:

It’s worth noting that Iran’s strategy of wearing down Israel and other U.S. allies in the region is not merely a choice, but a necessity. Militarily, it’s the only card left in Tehran’s hand. Iran neither desires nor possesses the capability to deploy ground forces against Israel, given the vast geographical distance and intervening countries. Moreover, while Israel boasts one of the world’s most formidable air forces, Iran’s air capabilities are comparatively limited.

Israel’s trump card in this high-stakes game is its unparalleled air-defense system. For years, Iran had counted on its network of proxy organizations to provide a protective umbrella against Western strikes. However, a year into the current conflict, this strategy lies in tatters: Hamas is reeling, Hizballah is on the back foot, and the various militias in Iraq and Yemen amount to little more than an irritant for Israel. The result? Iran finds itself unexpectedly exposed.

And when it comes to direct attacks on Israel, Iran’s options may be limited. Its October 1 attack, which used its sophisticated Fateh-2 missiles, was more effective than that in April, but not much more so:

Oded Eilam, drawing on his experience as a former senior Mossad official, . .  estimates [Iran’s] stockpile of these advanced weapons is limited to between 400 and 800. With 200 already expended in a single attack, Iran’s reserves of truly effective missiles may be running low. This raises a critical question: can Iran sustain a prolonged ballistic exchange with Israel? The numbers suggest it’s capacity for attrition warfare may be more limited than it would like to admit.