On Monday, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its most recent report on the Islamic Republic’s compliance with the 2015 nuclear agreement, which lists numerous breaches. The report follows on Tehran’s recent announcement that it has begun enriching uranium up to 5 percent, ignoring the 3.67-percent cap to which it committed itself in 2015. Moreover, the IAEA confirmed Israel’s finding that Iran is storing uranium at a previously undisclosed site. David Albright and Andrea Stricker summarize and analyze these findings and others:

Iran . . . started uranium enrichment at the Fordow fuel-enrichment plant; increased its quantity of low-enriched uranium above the 300kg cap, ramping up monthly production significantly; [and] increased the number and type of centrifuges enriching uranium above the limit of 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges. The total . . . uranium enrichment has increased [to] 36 percent above the enrichment capacity allowed. . . . Iran [also] installed and operated several new, advanced centrifuge types at the [Fordow reactor] not listed as permitted for installation in the nuclear deal.

The breakout time, or the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough [highly enriched] uranium for a nuclear weapon, has shifted downward, . . . from about eight-to-twelve months to six-to-ten months. The breakout time will decrease further as Iran increases its stock of enriched uranium and installs more centrifuges.

Iran is [therefore] increasing its enrichment capacity and its experience in operating advanced centrifuges. While the former is reversible, the latter is not. This knowledge and experience cannot be lost.

Albright and Stricker also note several points the IAEA report overlooks:

The report does not discuss Iran’s denial of access to an inspector at its Natanz [nuclear facility, and] is completely silent on the issue of the IAEA’s investigation of the nuclear archive [discovered last year by the Mossad], and whether this matter could rise to the level of a violation of the nuclear deal itself, under which Iran committed “under no circumstances ever [to] seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons.” The existence of the archive may also violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Iran’s safeguards agreements.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.