In 2015, the Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman was close to concluding his investigation into the 1994 bombing of the Buenos Aires Jewish center (AMIA) by Iranian operatives. But he was found dead the day before he was supposed to report to the country’s congress on his findings that high-ranking government officials, including then-President Cristina Kirchner, now the vice-president—covered up Iran’s responsibility for the bombing. Benny Avni writes:

Kirchner and her supporters in the press quickly spread the notion that Nisman committed suicide—a strange act for a man about to make public a case marking the culmination of his life’s work. Consequent investigations completely demolished the suicide theory. . . . During the presidency of Kirchner’s successor, Mauricio Macri, the suicide theory was widely discarded.

[Meanwhile], a documentary series on Nisman’s death, widely distributed on Netflix, tries to present both as possibilities. The six-part series claims to show “all sides”: Kirchner acolytes insist on the suicide theory while others maintain he was murdered. That is, both flat-earthers and scientists are given equal time.

Macri, [whose presidency lasted from 2015 to 2019], tried to end the charade. . . . During his tenure, Kirchner and others were indicted on coverup charges. But Macri is [now out of office] and she is vice-president, and as such immune from incarceration. Worse: in February the judge assigned to continue Nisman’s investigation into the terrorism cases . . . passed away [and] Kirchner loyalists were named as successors.

So it looks like the government is set to wind down the AMIA investigations. The Iranian masterminds, Hizballah operatives, and Argentine collaborators will not be brought to justice. Kirchner is protected from any accusation of complicity in Nisman’s death. Any hope of closure for terror victims’ loved ones is fast fading.

Recent satellite imagery has shown a buildup of Egyptian tanks near the Israeli border, in violation of Egypt-Israel agreements going back to the 1970s. It’s possible Cairo wants to prevent Palestinians from entering the Sinai from Gaza, or perhaps it wants to send a message to the U.S. that it will take all measures necessary to keep that from happening. But there is also a chance, however small, that it could be preparing for something more dangerous. David Wurmser examines President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi’s predicament:

Egypt’s abysmal behavior in allowing its common border with Gaza to be used for the dangerous smuggling of weapons, money, and materiel to Hamas built the problem that exploded on October 7. Hamas could arm only to the level that Egypt enabled it. Once exposed, rather than help Israel fix the problem it enabled, Egypt manufactured tensions with Israel to divert attention from its own culpability.

Now that the Trump administration is threatening to remove the population of Gaza, President Sisi is reaping the consequences of a problem he and his predecessors helped to sow. That, writes Wurmser, leaves him with a dilemma:

On one hand, Egypt fears for its regime’s survival if it accepts Trump’s plan. It would position Cairo as a participant in a second disaster, or nakba. It knows from its own history; King Farouk was overthrown in 1952 in part for his failure to prevent the first nakba in 1948. Any leader who fails to stop a second nakba, let alone participates in it, risks losing legitimacy and being seen as weak. The perception of buckling on the Palestine issue also resulted in the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981. President Sisi risks being seen by his own population as too weak to stand up to Israel or the United States, as not upholding his manliness.

In a worst-case scenario, Wurmser argues, Sisi might decide that he’d rather fight a disastrous war with Israel and blow up his relationship with Washington than display that kind of weakness.