While the European Union, and many of its individual members, likes to hold itself as the great defender of human rights and international law—and rarely hesitates to condemn Israel for alleged breaches—it has consistently been slow to speak out about the misdeeds of the Islamic Republic. Benjamin Weinthal, focusing on Germany, writes:

Germany’s eagerness to do business with Iran’s regime has been a constant since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. . . . Iran’s 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and taking hostage of 52 American diplomats and citizens, who were held for 444 days, did nothing to upset German-Iranian relations. Likewise, Europe works not only to keep Iran’s regime afloat but also, witting or unwittingly, to enhance Tehran’s military apparatus through the provision of dual-use goods (civilian technology that also could have a military purpose).

[The] trade numbers and deals between Germany and Iran bespeak a profound indifference to international security and the safety of the Jewish state. This despite Chancellor Angela Merkel’s famous declaration to Israel’s Knesset in 2008 that the security of the Jewish state is “non-negotiable” for her administration.

The massive gap between her rhetoric and her actions betray a largely pro-Iran regime foreign policy. . . . Europe’s most powerful economic engine, Germany, and the rest of the EU, have sadly opted to align themselves with the Islamic Republic of Iran on the pressing issues of Iran’s nuclear program, and its stomach-turning human-rights record.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.