So far, the most significant event in the Middle East of 2021 has been the formal end to the diplomatic conflict that pitted Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain against Qatar. Alberto M. Fernandez is hopeful about the improvement in relations, but uncertain as to its longevity:

[T]here is much good that could come out of a real reconciliation. The dispute was expensive for both sides, disrupted trade and economic ties, encouraged regional meddling, and generally introduced additional elements of instability and tension into an already unstable region. But was [the step] a true breakthrough, or was it more a pause in what will turn out to be a longer struggle for power?

Certainly, the countries that pushed for this step the most—Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, rather than the United States—are hoping for the best. But I am skeptical because there is a basic problem that has not and probably cannot be resolved: . . . Qatar’s great success in power projection through its Faustian alliance with the partisans of political Islam, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, in the region. This is a fateful relationship seen as a threat by several of its neighbors.

Qatar’s role as the bankroller and backstop of Islamist movements and states (Erdogan’s Turkey and Hamas-ruled Gaza) has brought it regional power. Qatar is a tiny country—it has more Indians and Bangladeshis than Qatari citizens, who constitute only 12 percent of their own country’s population—but it has gained great influence through an adept combination of money, media, and politics. One can decry such an outcome while at the same time marveling that it has proven to be so wildly successful.

Observing some of the recent commentary found in Qatar’s powerful media empire—which includes the anti-American and anti-Semitic Al Jazeera—Fernandez detects many signs the peninsular emirate has not changed its tune.

Between December 27 and January 6, terrorists in Gaza fired rockets at Israel almost every night. On Monday, one rocket struck a home in the much-bombarded town of Sderot, although no one was injured. The rocket fire had largely halted last spring, and for some time barrages were often the result of Israeli forces closing in a Hamas unit or munitions depot. But the truth—which gives credence to Ran Baratz’s argument in his January essay that the IDF is struggling to accomplish its mission—is that Hamas has been able to rebuild. Yoni Ben Menachem writes that the jihadist group has been “producing hundreds of new rockets using lathes smuggled into tunnels that remain operational in Gaza.” Moreover, it has been replenishing its ranks:

According to Israeli security officials, Hamas has recruited approximately 4,000 new fighters over the past month. This rapid expansion bolsters its fighting capabilities and complicates Israel’s efforts to apply military pressure on Hamas to expedite a hostage deal. Hamas’s military recovery has allowed it to prolong its war of attrition against the IDF and adopt tougher stances in hostage negotiations. The funds for this recruitment effort are reportedly from the sale of humanitarian-aid packages, which Hamas forcibly seizes and resells in Gaza’s markets.

In fact, Ben Menachem writes, Hamas’s rocket fire is part of the same strategy:

By firing rockets, Hamas seeks to demonstrate its resilience and operational capability despite the IDF’s prolonged offensive. This message is aimed at both Gaza’s residents and the Israeli public, underscoring that Hamas remains a significant force even after enduring heavy losses [and] that Israel cannot easily occupy this region, currently a focal point of IDF operations.