So far, the most significant event in the Middle East of 2021 has been the formal end to the diplomatic conflict that pitted Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain against Qatar. Alberto M. Fernandez is hopeful about the improvement in relations, but uncertain as to its longevity:

[T]here is much good that could come out of a real reconciliation. The dispute was expensive for both sides, disrupted trade and economic ties, encouraged regional meddling, and generally introduced additional elements of instability and tension into an already unstable region. But was [the step] a true breakthrough, or was it more a pause in what will turn out to be a longer struggle for power?

Certainly, the countries that pushed for this step the most—Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, rather than the United States—are hoping for the best. But I am skeptical because there is a basic problem that has not and probably cannot be resolved: . . . Qatar’s great success in power projection through its Faustian alliance with the partisans of political Islam, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, in the region. This is a fateful relationship seen as a threat by several of its neighbors.

Qatar’s role as the bankroller and backstop of Islamist movements and states (Erdogan’s Turkey and Hamas-ruled Gaza) has brought it regional power. Qatar is a tiny country—it has more Indians and Bangladeshis than Qatari citizens, who constitute only 12 percent of their own country’s population—but it has gained great influence through an adept combination of money, media, and politics. One can decry such an outcome while at the same time marveling that it has proven to be so wildly successful.

Observing some of the recent commentary found in Qatar’s powerful media empire—which includes the anti-American and anti-Semitic Al Jazeera—Fernandez detects many signs the peninsular emirate has not changed its tune.

While conventional wisdom in the Western press believes that the war with Hamas has left Jerusalem more isolated and scuttled chances of expanding the Abraham Accords, Gabriel Scheinmann points to a very different reality. He begins with Iran’s massive drone and missile attack on Israel last month, and the coalition that helped defend against it:

America’s Arab allies had, in various ways, provided intelligence and allowed U.S. and Israeli planes to operate in their airspace. Jordan, which has been vociferously attacking Israel’s conduct in Gaza for months, even publicly acknowledged that it shot down incoming Iranian projectiles. When the chips were down, the Arab coalition held and made clear where they stood in the broader Iranian war on Israel.

The successful batting away of the Iranian air assault also engendered awe in Israel’s air-defense capabilities, which have performed marvelously throughout the war. . . . Israel’s response to the Iranian night of missiles should give further courage to Saudi Arabia to codify its alignment. Israel . . . telegraphed clearly to Tehran that it could hit precise targets without its aircraft being endangered and that the threshold of a direct Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear or other sites had been breached.

The entire episode demonstrated that Israel can both hit Iranian sites and defend against an Iranian response. At a time when the United States is focused on de-escalation and restraint, Riyadh could see quite clearly that only Israel has both the capability and the will to deal with the Iranian threat.

It is impossible to know whether the renewed U.S.-Saudi-Israel negotiations will lead to a normalization deal in the immediate months ahead. . . . Regardless of the status of this deal, [however], or how difficult the war in Gaza may appear, America’s Arab allies have now become Israel’s.