For the first time since 2006, Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and possibly Jerusalem are planning to vote in parliamentary elections, to be held on May 22. These are to be followed in June by a presidential election, in which the incumbent—Mahmoud Abbas, who was voted into office for a four-year term in 2005—plans to run. Both Abbas’s Fatah faction and its rival, Hamas, have agreed to participate in the race. Jonathan Schanzer comments:

Polls suggest that Hamas could emerge as the strongest party once again. More gridlock, dysfunction, and strife could follow. . . .With no restrictions on Hamas’s participation and as Abbas’s polling numbers flatline, the Palestinian Authority [PA] looks likely to be heading for a repeat of 2006, [where a Hamas victory led to a brief civil war and the severing of Gaza from the West Bank]. That said, a recent change in the Palestinian election law stipulating proportional representation in parliament will make outright control more difficult for one party. But a Palestinian Authority significantly influenced by Hamas is not just possible; it’s probable.

But the blame belongs to Abbas. In his sixteen years of absolute power, he has barred political challengers and shut down political debate. If Palestinian elections are held, they will occur in a political vacuum. The alternative was a patient process of institution-building along the lines of what Salam Fayyad, [who served as the PA prime minister from 2007-2013 and plans to run in the upcoming election], advocated. As he knew well, democracy is a system of governance that cannot be built on voting alone. Rather, it must be built on parties, structures, and the rigorous debate of ideas.

That’s not possible this time around. But Abbas could still postpone the elections or work with other parties to restrict terrorist participation. Should he reject both of these paths, a new Palestinian political crisis is slated to begin on May 22.

How did Qatar, an American ally, become the nerve center of the leading Palestinian jihadist organization? Natalie Ecanow explains.

When Jordan expelled Hamas in 1999, Qatar offered sanctuary to the group, which had already become notorious for using suicide-bombing attacks over the previous decade. . . . Hamas chose to relocate to Syria. However, that arrangement lasted for only a decade. With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the terror group found its way back to Qatar.

In 2003, Hamas leaders reportedly convened in Qatar after the IDF attempted to eliminate Hamas’s founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, following a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem that killed seven people, including two American citizens. This episode led to one of the first efforts by Qatar to advocate for its terror proxy.

Thirteen years and five wars between Hamas and Israel later, Qatar’s support for Hamas has not waned. . . . To this day, Qatari officials maintain that the office came at the “request from Washington to establish indirect lines of communication with Hamas.” However, an Obama White House official asserted that there was never any request from Washington. . . . Inexplicably, the United States government continues to rely on Qatar to negotiate for the release of the hostages held by Hamas, even as the regime hosts the terror group’s political elite.

A reckoning is needed between our two countries. Congressional hearings, legislation, executive orders, and other measures to regulate relations between our countries are long overdue.