When the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad launched his bloody war against his own people in 2011, there were those who contended that, unpleasant as the Assad regime was, it was the only viable alternative to letting the country be taken over by terrorists. (This argument ignored Damascus’s support for Hizballah, or the fact that, at the time, it provided Hamas with its home base.) Vladimir Putin later seized upon this reasoning to justify Russia’s intervention in the war. With the rise of Islamic State (IS), this logic was taken one step further: the U.S. should make common cause with Assad’s patron, the Islamic Republic of Iran, to defeat the new terrorist threat. Matthew Levitt tells a very different story:

The regime of Bashar al-Assad consistently supported Islamic State when the group controlled significant amounts of territory, even as the regime struggled to retake control of Syrian territory from various rebel groups engaged in the Syrian civil war, including IS. One key tactic of the regime’s strategy was to focus its military efforts against the moderate Syrian rebel groups opposing the Assad dictatorship, in particular the Free Syrian Army, and not the Islamic State group.

It is, [moreover], inconceivable that Syrian intelligence could have assisted, facilitated, or tolerated IS operatives, [as it indeed did], without prior decision-making at the highest levels of the Syrian government. The Syrian regime made this strategic decision to enable and facilitate the continued survival of Islamic State in Syria in an effort to paint all of the Syrian opposition as “terrorists.”

One reason the Assad regime may have elected not to target IS positions in eastern Syria was the regime’s business dealings with the organization. The U.S. State Department has stated unequivocally that “the Syrian regime has purchased oil from IS through various intermediaries, adding to the terrorist group’s revenue.” . . . The Syrian regime also supported the financing of IS by allowing Syrian banks to continue to function and to provide financial services within IS-held territory. . . . [It] also looked the other way and allowed IS to conduct financial transactions through informal financial networks. [The] financial networks in question were not insignificant, making the Syrian government’s decision not to act against them, even once their activities became public, all the more galling.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.