In his address to the UN General Assembly two weeks ago, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett declared that “Iran’s nuclear-weapons program is at a critical point” and that “all red lines have been crossed.” This is no mere rhetoric, argues Joab Rosenberg; Tehran’s recent decision to enrich uranium to 60 percent and to begin work converting the substance into a metal bring it is perilously close to having a nuclear bomb. To understand what it might do next, Rosenberg turns to the nuclear program’s history:

Despite Iran’s ongoing denials, it is very clear that it was running a broad-ranging nuclear-weapons program in the 1990s and up until around 2004. . . . In 2003–2004, in a major shift, the leadership in Tehran changed the course of its nuclear program. It froze [much of the program at that point], while continuing to work on dual-use projects rather than on the direct development of nuclear weapons. [This] change of course . . . was driven by the impact of events of 9/11 and the U.S. war in Afghanistan and Iraq; it was meant to deflect Iran’s inclusion in the “axis of evil” by President Bush.

In 2021 Iran has seen the U.S. leave Afghanistan, and Washington may soon be withdrawing its forces from Iraq. . . . Little is left of the . . . once looming threat that led Tehran to wonder whether Iran may be next. . . . Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei can already judge that his major decisions—to allow enrichment to 60 percent and to start working on enriched uranium metal—did not lead to a firm response from the international community, other than empty declarations and statements.

It is still possible to pray that good diplomatic skills will bring Iran back into the 2015 nuclear deal, or a version thereof. But it is now just as probable that the Iranians are actually “breaking out,” . . . despite the fact it is a different “break out” than any of the experts had predicted: acquiring military-grade fissile material while still avowing that they do not seek a weapon. . . . The time for stopping Iran may be running out as we speak.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”