When the Arab Spring swept through the Middle East in 2011, overthrowing several regimes and threatening others, American policymakers and scholars were taken entirely by surprise. They were no better prepared for the eruption of protests in Sudan (where they overthrew a brutal Islamist dictatorship), Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt in 2019. In both years, Washington’s response was clumsy and occasionally destructive. Since the experts are unlikely to become much better at predicting such “black-swan” events, Sarah Feuer and David Schenker suggest some guidelines that American diplomats can follow the next time unexpected unrest strikes:

If the United States appears to back protestors in friendly states equally or more than demonstrators in adversarial states, it may damage bilateral ties with longstanding partners or reduce precisely the leverage such bilateral ties afford to Washington. Where possible, then, peaceful protests erupting in friendly states should be met by private, but firm, insistence from Washington that governments allow demonstrations to proceed while working to enact meaningful reforms that address the protesters’ grievances. Given the likely lack of U.S. influence on the trajectory of events, more robust—i.e., public—U.S. rhetorical support for protestors may be merited in unfriendly states.

Along these lines, Washington must consider the most appropriate approach toward states that have signed normalization agreements with Israel. Signatory states to the Abraham Accords . . . have periodically engaged in various degrees of repression of political dissent. What policy should Washington adopt toward these states?

In answering this question, it bears keeping in mind that U.S. interests would not be served by the fall of these governments. . . . At the very least, should major protests break out in these states, Washington will need to convey privately the expectation that peaceful demonstrations be permitted, even as it works with these governments to nurture the normalization deals and to ensure they can be leveraged to bring greater economic prosperity to the region.

[In addition, the U.S. should not] lose sight of great-power dynamics. Although there may be circumstances in which U.S. interests align with those of Russia and China, Washington should beware of cooperation offers with the two powers when it comes to engagement in the Arab world, not least when seeking to stave off or to respond to instability. Washington should avoid unforced errors that provide easy wins to China and Russia in the region.

Above all, they argue, America should “focus on the intersection of [its] interests and values.”

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.