When the Arab Spring swept through the Middle East in 2011, overthrowing several regimes and threatening others, American policymakers and scholars were taken entirely by surprise. They were no better prepared for the eruption of protests in Sudan (where they overthrew a brutal Islamist dictatorship), Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt in 2019. In both years, Washington’s response was clumsy and occasionally destructive. Since the experts are unlikely to become much better at predicting such “black-swan” events, Sarah Feuer and David Schenker suggest some guidelines that American diplomats can follow the next time unexpected unrest strikes:

If the United States appears to back protestors in friendly states equally or more than demonstrators in adversarial states, it may damage bilateral ties with longstanding partners or reduce precisely the leverage such bilateral ties afford to Washington. Where possible, then, peaceful protests erupting in friendly states should be met by private, but firm, insistence from Washington that governments allow demonstrations to proceed while working to enact meaningful reforms that address the protesters’ grievances. Given the likely lack of U.S. influence on the trajectory of events, more robust—i.e., public—U.S. rhetorical support for protestors may be merited in unfriendly states.

Along these lines, Washington must consider the most appropriate approach toward states that have signed normalization agreements with Israel. Signatory states to the Abraham Accords . . . have periodically engaged in various degrees of repression of political dissent. What policy should Washington adopt toward these states?

In answering this question, it bears keeping in mind that U.S. interests would not be served by the fall of these governments. . . . At the very least, should major protests break out in these states, Washington will need to convey privately the expectation that peaceful demonstrations be permitted, even as it works with these governments to nurture the normalization deals and to ensure they can be leveraged to bring greater economic prosperity to the region.

[In addition, the U.S. should not] lose sight of great-power dynamics. Although there may be circumstances in which U.S. interests align with those of Russia and China, Washington should beware of cooperation offers with the two powers when it comes to engagement in the Arab world, not least when seeking to stave off or to respond to instability. Washington should avoid unforced errors that provide easy wins to China and Russia in the region.

Above all, they argue, America should “focus on the intersection of [its] interests and values.”

With the IDF engaged in ground maneuvers in both northern and southern Gaza, and a plan about to go into effect next week that would separate more than 100,000 civilians from Hamas’s control, an end to the war may at last be in sight. Yet there seems to be no agreement within Israel, or without, about what should become of the territory. Efraim Inbar assesses the various proposals, from Donald Trump’s plan to remove the population entirely, to the Israeli far-right’s desire to settle the Strip with Jews, to the internationally supported proposal to place Gaza under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA)—and exposes the fatal flaws of each. He therefore tries to reframe the problem:

[M]any Arab states have failed to establish a monopoly on the use of force within their borders. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan all suffer from civil wars or armed militias that do not obey the central government.

Perhaps Israel needs to get used to the idea that in the absence of an entity willing to take Gaza under its wing, chaos will prevail there. This is less terrible than people may think. Chaos would allow Israel to establish buffer zones along the Gaza border without interference. Any entity controlling Gaza would oppose such measures and would resist necessary Israeli measures to reduce terrorism. Chaos may also encourage emigration.

Israel is doomed to live with bad neighbors for the foreseeable future. There is no way to ensure zero terrorism. Israel should avoid adopting a policy of containment and should constantly “mow the grass” to minimize the chances of a major threat emerging across the border. Periodic conflicts may be necessary. If the Jews want a state in their homeland, they need to internalize that Israel will have to live by the sword for many more years.