For years, Washington has maintained good relations with Doha, in part because this oil- and gas-rich emirate is home to a key U.S. air-force base. On February 1, President Biden officially designated Qatar a “major non-NATO ally.” Yigal Carmon, in an interview by Ariel Ben Solomon, argues against the decision:

The relationship between Qatar and the United States is bizarre, and makes no strategic sense. . . . For decades, Qatar has provided financial and political support, directly and indirectly, to virtually every anti-American Islamic terrorist organization. . . . Qatar funded the Taliban throughout America’s presence in Afghanistan, yet the American administration is eagerly thanking Qatar for its “help” in preventing an even greater disaster during the withdrawal last August.

If it weren’t for Qatar, the September 11 attacks might not have taken place. . . . In 1996, the terrorist mastermind Khalid Sheikh Muhammad [KSM] had been under Qatari protection in Doha. When the U.S. government notified the Qatari emir that they were coming to arrest KSM for his involvement in terrorist plots, KSM disappeared within hours, only to reappear in 2001 as the mastermind behind 9/11.

Then there is the matter of Al Jazeera, which is owned by the Qatari government and is one of the world’s greatest fomenters of anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism, and jihadism:

The Qatari-based channel has . . . aired calls for terror attacks against American oil installations. It even hosted a birthday party—complete with a large cake, fireworks, and a band—for the released terrorist Samir al-Kuntar, who brutally murdered a four-year-old [Israeli] girl and her father in 1979.

The lesson, says Carmon, is that “crime pays.”

When he called upon Hamas to end the war and release the hostages last week, the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas was also getting ready for a reshuffle within his regime. On Saturday, he appointed Hussein al-Sheikh deputy president of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is intimately tied to the PA itself. Al-Sheikh would therefore succeed Abbas—who is eighty-nine and reportedly in ill health—as head of the PLO if he should die or become incapacitated, and be positioned to succeed him as head of the PA as well.

Al-Sheikh spent eleven years in an Israeli prison and, writes Maurice Hirsch, was involved in planning a 2002 Jerusalem suicide bombing that killed three. Moreover, Hirsch writes, he “does not enjoy broad Palestinian popularity or support.”

Still, by appointing Al-Sheikh, Abbas has taken a step in the internal reforms he inaugurated last year in the hope that he could prove to the Biden administration and other relevant players that the PA was up to the task of governing the Gaza Strip. Neomi Neumann writes:

Abbas’s motivation for reform also appears rooted in the need to meet the expectations of Arab and European donors without compromising his authority. On April 14, the EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas approved a three-year aid package worth 1.6 billion euros, including 620 million euros in direct budget support tied to reforms. Meanwhile, the French president Emmanuel Macron held a call with Abbas [earlier this month] and noted afterward that reforms are essential for the PA to be seen as a viable governing authority for Gaza—a telling remark given reports that Paris may soon recognize “the state of Palestine.”

In some cases, reforms appear targeted at specific regional partners. The idea of appointing a vice-president originated with Saudi Arabia.

In the near term, Abbas’s main goal appears to be preserving Arab and European support ahead of a major international conference in New York this June.