In a recent formal letter, the attorney general of Oklahoma opined that state laws prohibiting the creation of religious charter schools violate the First Amendment. Charter schools are privately run but receive public funds, and thus find themselves in an ambiguous position between public and private educational institutions. Nicole Stelle Garnett argues that the attorney general is correct:

Forty-four states have charter-school laws. All, like Oklahoma, have required charter schools to be secular and most, like Oklahoma, also prohibit them from being operated by or affiliated with religious institutions. The constitutionality of these restrictions [is at issue], especially since the Court’s decision in Espinoza v. Montana two years ago, which clarified that while “a state need not subsidize private education; . . . once a state decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.”

Opening the door to religious charter schools will result in the creation of new religious schools, adding valuable pluralism to the American educational landscape. Many parents will embrace them for their children, and education reformers should, as well. Of course, not all religious schools will become charter schools. Many may reasonably choose not to, especially in states with robust school-choice programs, which tend to give participating schools even more freedom than charter laws do. But the question whether religious organizations should operate charter schools is not the same as the question whether they should be permitted to do so. The first question turns on prudential judgment; the second turns on the meaning of the First Amendment.

When he called upon Hamas to end the war and release the hostages last week, the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas was also getting ready for a reshuffle within his regime. On Saturday, he appointed Hussein al-Sheikh deputy president of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is intimately tied to the PA itself. Al-Sheikh would therefore succeed Abbas—who is eighty-nine and reportedly in ill health—as head of the PLO if he should die or become incapacitated, and be positioned to succeed him as head of the PA as well.

Al-Sheikh spent eleven years in an Israeli prison and, writes Maurice Hirsch, was involved in planning a 2002 Jerusalem suicide bombing that killed three. Moreover, Hirsch writes, he “does not enjoy broad Palestinian popularity or support.”

Still, by appointing Al-Sheikh, Abbas has taken a step in the internal reforms he inaugurated last year in the hope that he could prove to the Biden administration and other relevant players that the PA was up to the task of governing the Gaza Strip. Neomi Neumann writes:

Abbas’s motivation for reform also appears rooted in the need to meet the expectations of Arab and European donors without compromising his authority. On April 14, the EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas approved a three-year aid package worth 1.6 billion euros, including 620 million euros in direct budget support tied to reforms. Meanwhile, the French president Emmanuel Macron held a call with Abbas [earlier this month] and noted afterward that reforms are essential for the PA to be seen as a viable governing authority for Gaza—a telling remark given reports that Paris may soon recognize “the state of Palestine.”

In some cases, reforms appear targeted at specific regional partners. The idea of appointing a vice-president originated with Saudi Arabia.

In the near term, Abbas’s main goal appears to be preserving Arab and European support ahead of a major international conference in New York this June.