The First Amendment Case for Religious Charter Schools

In a recent formal letter, the attorney general of Oklahoma opined that state laws prohibiting the creation of religious charter schools violate the First Amendment. Charter schools are privately run but receive public funds, and thus find themselves in an ambiguous position between public and private educational institutions. Nicole Stelle Garnett argues that the attorney general is correct:

Forty-four states have charter-school laws. All, like Oklahoma, have required charter schools to be secular and most, like Oklahoma, also prohibit them from being operated by or affiliated with religious institutions. The constitutionality of these restrictions [is at issue], especially since the Court’s decision in Espinoza v. Montana two years ago, which clarified that while “a state need not subsidize private education; . . . once a state decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.”

Opening the door to religious charter schools will result in the creation of new religious schools, adding valuable pluralism to the American educational landscape. Many parents will embrace them for their children, and education reformers should, as well. Of course, not all religious schools will become charter schools. Many may reasonably choose not to, especially in states with robust school-choice programs, which tend to give participating schools even more freedom than charter laws do. But the question whether religious organizations should operate charter schools is not the same as the question whether they should be permitted to do so. The first question turns on prudential judgment; the second turns on the meaning of the First Amendment.

Read more at City Journal

More about: Education, First Amendment, Freedom of Religion, School choice

What Israel Can Achieve in Gaza, the Fate of the Hostages, and Planning for the Day After

In a comprehensive analysis, Azar Gat concludes that Israel’s prosecution of the war has so far been successful, and preferable to the alternatives proposed by some knowledgeable critics. (For a different view, see this article by Lazar Berman.) But even if the IDF is coming closer to destroying Hamas, is it any closer to freeing the remaining hostages? Gat writes:

Hamas’s basic demand in return for the release of all the hostages—made clear well before it was declared publicly—is an end to the war and not a ceasefire. This includes the withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip, restoration of Hamas’s control over it (including international guarantees), and a prisoner exchange on the basis of “all for all.”

Some will say that there must be a middle ground between Hamas’s demands and what Israel can accept. However, Hamas’s main interest is to ensure its survival and continued rule, and it will not let go of its key bargaining chip. Some say that without the return of the hostages—“at any price”—no victory is possible. While this sentiment is understandable, the alternative would be a resounding national defeat. The utmost efforts must be made to rescue as many hostages as possible, and Israel should be ready to pay a heavy price for this goal; but Israel’s capitulation is not an option.

Beyond the great cost in human life that Israel will pay over time for such a deal, Hamas will return to rule the Gaza Strip, repairing its infrastructure of tunnels and rockets, filling its ranks with new recruits, and restoring its defensive and offensive arrays. This poses a critical question for those suggesting that it will be possible to restart the war at a later stage: have they fully considered the human toll should the IDF attempt to reoccupy the areas it would have vacated in the Gaza Strip?

Although Gat is sanguine about the prospects of the current campaign, he throws some cold water on those who hope for an absolute victory:

Militarily, it is possible to destroy Hamas’s command, military units, and infrastructure as a semi-regular military organization. . . . After their destruction in high-intensity fighting, the IDF must prevent Hamas from reviving by continuous action on the ground. As in the West Bank, this project will take years. . . . What the IDF is unlikely to achieve is the elimination of Hamas as a guerrilla force.

Lastly, Gat has some wise words about what will happen to Gaza after the war ends, a subject that has been getting renewed attention since Benjamin Netanyahu presented an outline of a plan to the war cabinet on Thursday. Gat argues that, contrary to the view of the American and European foreign-policy elite, there is no political solution for Gaza. After all, Gaza is in the Middle East, where “there are no solutions, . . . only bad options and options that are much worse.”

Read more at Institute for National Security Studies

More about: Gaza Strip, Gaza War 2023, Israeli Security