In a recent formal letter, the attorney general of Oklahoma opined that state laws prohibiting the creation of religious charter schools violate the First Amendment. Charter schools are privately run but receive public funds, and thus find themselves in an ambiguous position between public and private educational institutions. Nicole Stelle Garnett argues that the attorney general is correct:

Forty-four states have charter-school laws. All, like Oklahoma, have required charter schools to be secular and most, like Oklahoma, also prohibit them from being operated by or affiliated with religious institutions. The constitutionality of these restrictions [is at issue], especially since the Court’s decision in Espinoza v. Montana two years ago, which clarified that while “a state need not subsidize private education; . . . once a state decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.”

Opening the door to religious charter schools will result in the creation of new religious schools, adding valuable pluralism to the American educational landscape. Many parents will embrace them for their children, and education reformers should, as well. Of course, not all religious schools will become charter schools. Many may reasonably choose not to, especially in states with robust school-choice programs, which tend to give participating schools even more freedom than charter laws do. But the question whether religious organizations should operate charter schools is not the same as the question whether they should be permitted to do so. The first question turns on prudential judgment; the second turns on the meaning of the First Amendment.

Between the explosion of thousands of Hizballah pagers on September 17 and now, Iran’s geopolitical clout has shrunk dramatically: Hizballah, Iran’s most important striking force, has retreated to lick its wounds; Iranian influence in Syria has collapsed; Iran’s attempts to attack Israel via Gaza have proved self-defeating; its missile and drone arsenal have proved impotent; and its territorial defenses have proved useless in the face of Israeli airpower. Edward Luttwack considers what might happen next:

The myth of Iranian power was ironically propagated by the United States itself. Right at the start of his first term, in January 2009, Barack Obama was terrified that he would be maneuvered into fighting a war against Iran. . . . Obama started his tenure by apologizing for America’s erstwhile support for the shah. And beyond showing contrition for the past, the then-president also set a new rule, one that lasted all the way to October 2024: Iran may attack anyone, but none may attack Iran.

[Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s] variegated fighters, in light trucks and jeeps, could have been stopped by a few hundred well-trained soldiers. But neither Hizballah nor Iran’s own Revolutionary Guards could react. Hizballah no longer has any large units capable of crossing the border to fight rebels in Syria, as they had done so many times before. As for the Revolutionary Guards, they were commandeering civilian airliners to fly troops into Damascus airport to support Assad. But then Israel made clear that it would not allow Iran’s troops so close to its border, and Iran no longer had credible counter-threats.

Now Iran’s population is discovering that it has spent decades in poverty to pay for the massive build-up of the Revolutionary Guards and all their militias. And for what? They have elaborate bases and showy headquarters, but their expensive ballistic missiles can only be used against defenseless Arabs, not Israel with its Arrow interceptors. As for Hizballah, clearly it cannot even defend itself, let alone Iran’s remaining allies in the region. Perhaps, in short, the dictatorship will finally be challenged in the streets of Iran’s cities, at scale and in earnest.