On May 25, the White House issued a 60-page document outlining its approach to combating anti-Semitism. Avi Weiss and Eitan Fischberger have no criticism of what it includes—especially such measures as helping to provide added security to Jewish institutions—but only for what it leaves out:

There is zero mention in [the document] of the words “Zionist,” “Zionism,” or any variation of the word. Not one. When people convey messages of “Zionism is racism” or “Zionism is terrorism,” they are speaking to millions of Jews living in Israel and millions more worldwide, across all denominations, who passionately express their dream of Zion in their daily prayers, in the Jewish wedding service, and in expressions of condolence in houses of mourning. These messages malign Jews as racists or terrorists and can easily inspire reprisal acts of anti-Semitism.

And while the strategy lays out dangers that students on campus face because of their perceived or real support of Israel—and insists that security for these students be guaranteed—it does not offer a plan to respond educationally to this phenomenon. Time and again it emphasizes the need for education about the Holocaust and the role Jews play in American society, but it fails even to suggest a program or curriculum that would teach the meaning of Zionism going back to biblical times, or how the state of Israel is profoundly tied to the Jewish people.

It’s no secret, too, that the majority of anti-Semitic acts in America are taking place in ḥaredi/ḥasidic communities, such as Monsey, Crown Heights, and Borough Park, all in New York. With their visibly Jewish garbs, these innocent people can—and have been—easily singled out for constant attack. This is raw anti-Semitism, attacking Jews because they are Jews. One would imagine, then, that the strategy would devote much attention to this challenge.

Not so. Only in two small paragraphs, one in Appendix A at the conclusion of the 60-page strategy, is this matter mentioned, sounding therefore like a postscript, the classic too little, too late.

When he called upon Hamas to end the war and release the hostages last week, the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas was also getting ready for a reshuffle within his regime. On Saturday, he appointed Hussein al-Sheikh deputy president of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is intimately tied to the PA itself. Al-Sheikh would therefore succeed Abbas—who is eighty-nine and reportedly in ill health—as head of the PLO if he should die or become incapacitated, and be positioned to succeed him as head of the PA as well.

Al-Sheikh spent eleven years in an Israeli prison and, writes Maurice Hirsch, was involved in planning a 2002 Jerusalem suicide bombing that killed three. Moreover, Hirsch writes, he “does not enjoy broad Palestinian popularity or support.”

Still, by appointing Al-Sheikh, Abbas has taken a step in the internal reforms he inaugurated last year in the hope that he could prove to the Biden administration and other relevant players that the PA was up to the task of governing the Gaza Strip. Neomi Neumann writes:

Abbas’s motivation for reform also appears rooted in the need to meet the expectations of Arab and European donors without compromising his authority. On April 14, the EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas approved a three-year aid package worth 1.6 billion euros, including 620 million euros in direct budget support tied to reforms. Meanwhile, the French president Emmanuel Macron held a call with Abbas [earlier this month] and noted afterward that reforms are essential for the PA to be seen as a viable governing authority for Gaza—a telling remark given reports that Paris may soon recognize “the state of Palestine.”

In some cases, reforms appear targeted at specific regional partners. The idea of appointing a vice-president originated with Saudi Arabia.

In the near term, Abbas’s main goal appears to be preserving Arab and European support ahead of a major international conference in New York this June.