Beijing’s expanding role in the Middle East has of late received much attention. China imports nearly half its oil from the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula, has been helping Saudia Arabia and the United Arab Emirates develop nuclear technology, and brokered an agreement between Riyadh and Tehran. But 2023 has also seen visits to the Persian Gulf by the prime ministers of Japan, South Korea, and India. Jonathan Fulton comments:

In 2013, China’s import of Gulf crude oil was valued at $61.3 billion. Other Asian powers were not far behind. Also in 2013, Gulf oil exports to Japan were valued at $38 billion and represented 90 percent of its oil imports, India imported $25 billion in Gulf oil (52 percent of its crude imports), and Korea imported $25 billion of Gulf oil, representing over 80 percent of Korea’s crude imports.

The geopolitical [implications] are important. Japan, India, and Korea each have a different relationship with Beijing, while sharing concerns about China’s political and economic practices and its vision for international order. The three have much to offer the Gulf countries in their developmental agendas. And all are aligned with Washington (though India less so). As great-power competition comes to the Gulf, inter-Asian rivalries will be an important new dynamic for the region.

That [the three] are U.S. allies and partners with shared concerns about China’s approach to the international order indicates that there is room for cooperation among them in coordinating their Gulf policies. One example of this potential is the I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, and U.S.) initiative, which provides a glimpse of what greater Asian participation in Middle Eastern affairs could look like.

Last week, Jordanian police arrested sixteen members of the country’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood for acquiring explosives, trying to manufacture drones, and planning rocket attacks. The cell was likely working in coordination with Hamas (the Palestinian offshoot of the Brotherhood) and Hizballah, and perhaps receiving funding from Iran. Ghaith al-Omari provides some background:

The Brotherhood has been active in Jordan since the 1940s, and its relations with the government remained largely cooperative for decades even as other political parties were banned in the 1950s. In exchange, the Brotherhood usually (but not always) supported the palace’s foreign policy and security measures, particularly against Communist and socialist parties.

Relations became more adversarial near the turn of the century after the Brotherhood vociferously opposed the 1994 peace treaty with Israel. The Arab Spring movement that emerged in 2011 saw further deterioration. Unlike other states in the region, however, Jordan did not completely crack down on the MB, instead seeking to limit its influence.

Yet the current Gaza war has seen another escalation, with the MB repeatedly accusing the government of cooperating with Israel and not doing enough to support the Palestinians.

Jordanian security circles are particularly worried about the MB’s vocal wartime identification with Hamas, an organization that was considered such a grave security threat that it was expelled from the kingdom in 1999. The sentiment among many Jordanian officials is that the previous lenient approach failed to change the MB’s behavior, emboldening the group instead.