Beijing’s expanding role in the Middle East has of late received much attention. China imports nearly half its oil from the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula, has been helping Saudia Arabia and the United Arab Emirates develop nuclear technology, and brokered an agreement between Riyadh and Tehran. But 2023 has also seen visits to the Persian Gulf by the prime ministers of Japan, South Korea, and India. Jonathan Fulton comments:

In 2013, China’s import of Gulf crude oil was valued at $61.3 billion. Other Asian powers were not far behind. Also in 2013, Gulf oil exports to Japan were valued at $38 billion and represented 90 percent of its oil imports, India imported $25 billion in Gulf oil (52 percent of its crude imports), and Korea imported $25 billion of Gulf oil, representing over 80 percent of Korea’s crude imports.

The geopolitical [implications] are important. Japan, India, and Korea each have a different relationship with Beijing, while sharing concerns about China’s political and economic practices and its vision for international order. The three have much to offer the Gulf countries in their developmental agendas. And all are aligned with Washington (though India less so). As great-power competition comes to the Gulf, inter-Asian rivalries will be an important new dynamic for the region.

That [the three] are U.S. allies and partners with shared concerns about China’s approach to the international order indicates that there is room for cooperation among them in coordinating their Gulf policies. One example of this potential is the I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, and U.S.) initiative, which provides a glimpse of what greater Asian participation in Middle Eastern affairs could look like.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.