Fighting among Palestinians in Lebanon May Benefit Hamas

Last month, after weeks of clashes in the Palestinian city of Ein el-Hilweh in Lebanon, the parties reached a ceasefire. The fighting, which left 31 dead and led thousands to flee, pitted the Fatah faction of the PLO—which is led by Mahmoud Abbas and governs the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank—against Islamist groups. Nada Homsi explains:

The clashes began when a Fatah gunman attempted to assassinate a leader of the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jund al-Sham group, according to security sources within the camp. The next day, Islamist militants killed the Fatah security commander Abu Ashraf al-Armoushi and four bodyguards. Fatah retaliated with force and attempted to expel militant groups from the camp.

By longstanding convention, the Lebanese state does not have jurisdiction over Palestinian refugee camps, leaving residents to handle security. In Ein el-Hilweh, radical Islamist groups like Jund al-Sham have exploited the lack of state oversight and loose internal security to establish their influence, which Fatah has been unable to subdue. According to Fatah and Hamas officials, the groups are made up of Lebanese, Palestinians, and Syrians, and are divided ideologically.

Hamas’s status as a relatively moderate Islamist party has allowed it to play a mediating role between hardline militants and Fatah. . . . But some in Fatah—including the senior official Azzam al-Ahmad, a member of the group’s central committee—have accused Hamas of playing a role in the fighting, which Hamas denies.

Meetings between Fatah and Hamas to discuss the clashes seem to have given Hamas a larger role in administering security in Ein el-Hilweh, which was traditionally primarily the job of Fatah’s National Security Forces.

Read more at The National

More about: Fatah, Hamas, Lebanon, Palestinians

Libya Gave Up Its Nuclear Aspirations Completely. Can Iran Be Induced to Do the Same?

April 18 2025

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.

Read more at Washington Times

More about: Iran nuclear program, Iraq war, Libya, U.S. Foreign policy