How Jews Became the Last Minority It’s Acceptable to Hate

The wave of anti-Semitism is not confined to America. In Sydney, Australia, a Jewish man was recently assaulted by a mob of what Sky News calls “Palestine supporters” and severely beaten; he is now recovering in a hospital. In the same city, a mass protest occurred on October 9 where demonstrators chanted “gas the Jews.” Nor has Great Britain been spared. Stephen Daisley, writing from that country, comments on why so many young people seem to be drawn to anti-Semitism:

It’s not that the world is particularly woke to anti-black or any other form of racism, but that it is particularly unwoke to anti-Jewish racism. There is an empathy gap when it comes to Jews, a mental or emotional distance from their suffering that is either not present with other groups or not as respectable to let slip. This may be a generational phenomenon. In the world the baby boomers grew up in, the Holocaust was the recent past. The war loomed over the culture and, in the liberal West at least, the death camps became the ultimate symbol of evil.

The TikTok generation are coming of age in a world where Israel is no longer seen as the miracle in the desert, the return of a nation to its homeland in the shadow of its near extinction, but the racist oppressor of the indigenous Palestinians. They have no frame for understanding anti-Semitism because they have been taught that the world is divided into white victimizers and black and brown victims. Jews don’t fit into that formula, Israeli Jews certainly don’t, and nor do the Palestinians, but as the formula is all they know, it must be made to fit.

Jews are the last minority it’s acceptable to hate, and not just acceptable but progressive.

Read more at Spectator

More about: Anti-Semitism

To Save Gaza, the U.S. Needs a Strategy to Restrain Iran

Since the outbreak of war on October 7, America has given Israel much support, and also much advice. Seth Cropsey argues that some of that advice hasn’t been especially good:

American demands for “restraint” and a “lighter footprint” provide significant elements of Hamas’s command structure, including Yahya Sinwar, the architect of 10/7, a far greater chance of surviving and preserving the organization’s capabilities. Its threat will persist to some extent in any case, since it has significant assets in Lebanon and is poised to enter into a full-fledged partnership with Hizballah that would give it access to Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps for recruitment and to Iranian-supported ratlines into Jordan and Syria.

Turning to the aftermath of the war, Cropsey observes that it will take a different kind of involvement for the U.S. to get the outcomes it desires, namely an alternative to Israeli and to Hamas rule in Gaza that comes with buy-in from its Arab allies:

The only way that Gaza can be governed in a sustainable and stable manner is through the participation of Arab states, and in particular the Gulf Arabs, and the only power that can deliver their participation is the United States. A grand bargain is impossible unless the U.S. exerts enough leverage to induce one.

Militarily speaking, the U.S. has shown no desire seriously to curb Iranian power. It has persistently signaled a desire to avoid escalation. . . . The Gulf Arabs understand this. They have no desire to engage in serious strategic dialogue with Washington and Jerusalem over Iran strategy, since Washington does not have an Iran strategy.

Gaza’s fate is a small part of a much broader strategic struggle. Unless this is recognized, any diplomatic master plan will degenerate into a diplomatic parlor game.

Read more at National Review

More about: Gaza War 2023, Iran, U.S. Foreign policy