As Tehran has gradually escalated its attacks on the U.S. and on commercial shipping—both directly and through its proxies—Washington has responded hesitantly and with minimal force out of fear of provoking escalation and finding itself in a broader conflict. This approach has predictably sent the ayatollahs the message that they can act with impunity, yielding exactly the sort of escalation the White House hoped to avoid. On Sunday, an Iran-backed militia in Syria carried out a drone strike on a U.S. base in Jordan, killing three American soldiers and wounding 34 others. Richard Goldberg writes:

The deadly assault . . . was the 159th Iran-directed attack on American forces in the Middle East since October 17. . . . But these assaults didn’t start on October 17. U.S. Central Command’s chief testified to Congress last year that Iran had directed 78 attacks on American forces in Iraq and Syria from January 2021 to March 2023.

These attacks left two other contractors dead and many more Americans injured. Tehran never once paid a price for these strikes. Nor does it today. To the contrary, Biden has rewarded the ayatollah to the tune of $100 billion—including massive revenue from the non-enforcement of U.S. oil sanctions over three years, a $6 billion ransom payment, and a $10 billion sanctions waiver renewed in November.

Biden’s ideological commitment to appeasing Tehran has incentivized these nonstop attacks. . . . His crippling fear of escalation has guaranteed escalation on all fronts—from the October 7 Hamas massacre to Hizballah missiles raining on northern Israel to Houthi strikes in the Red Sea to Iran’s accelerating production of high-enriched uranium to the attacks on American troops.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.