On Friday, the U.S. struck 85 Tehran-linked targets in Iraq and Syria in retaliation for the killing of three of its soldiers in Jordan. The next day, America was joined by the UK in bombing military facilities belonging to the Houthis, another Iranian proxy, throughout Yemen. The guerrillas likely had the opportunity to remove essential equipment and personnel from the targets beforehand, given that the White House spent a week warning that the attacks were imminent.

Reuel Marc Gerecht, in an article published just before last weekend’s strikes, examines what actions Washington would have to take to deter further attacks. Measured against his suggestions, the American response seems feeble indeed:

It’s hard to imagine any scenario—apart from a direct attack on Iran—in which the clerical regime ceases and desists. And any assault would need to be highly destructive, as a direct Western strike that leaves Iran’s nuclear-weapons program unscathed doesn’t make much sense.

Tehran will surely keep pushing the envelope unless the United States or Israel pushes back far harder. The clerical regime may pause its operations or claim that proxies are beyond its control—but success breeds aggression. So does the regime’s conception of itself as an Islamist paladin battling American and Zionist imperialism.

As a result, if Washington responds to the attack in Jordan with just another air strike against Iranian-supported militias, or even Iranian deployments in Syria, this likely won’t alter Ayatollah Ruhollah Khamenei’s calculations. Only something shockingly different—U.S. attacks against Revolutionary Guard targets inside Iran, and the openly declared threat of insurmountable American escalation—has a decent chance of convincing the clerics that the past is no longer prologue.

In a statement released on social media on Monday, the president-elect declared that if the hostages held by Hamas are not released before his inauguration, “there will be all hell to pay” for those who “perpetrated these atrocities against humanity.” But will Hamas take such a threat seriously? And, even if Donald Trump decides to convert his words into actions after taking office, exactly what steps could he take? Ron Ben-Yishai writes:

While Trump lacks direct military options against Hamas—given Israel’s ongoing actions—he holds three powerful levers to pressure the group into showing some flexibility on the hostage deal or to punish it if it resists after his inauguration. The first lever targets Hamas’s finances, focusing on its ability to fund activities after the fighting ends. This extends beyond Gaza to Lebanon and other global hubs where Hamas derives strength. . . . Additionally, Trump could pressure Qatar to cut off its generous funding and donations to the Islamist organization.

The other levers are also financial rather than military: increasing sanctions on Iran to force it to pressure Hamas, and withholding aid for the reconstruction of Gaza until the hostages are released. In Ben-Yishai’s view, “Trump’s statement undoubtedly represents a positive development and could accelerate the process toward a hostage-release agreement.”