The Believer and the Modern Study of the Bible is a collection of essays—mostly by Orthodox university scholars and rabbis living in Israel—about the problem of reconciling Jewish faith with the theories of the past century-and-a-half of secular Bible scholarship. While Ysoscher Katz finds much to praise in the volume, he deems deficient two essays that attempt to use the ancient rabbis’ approach to exegesis as a sort of permission slip for modern religious readers to read the Hebrew Bible in ways long deemed heretical:

Offering a novel understanding of midrash, Rabbi Yehuda Brandes argues that its authors were precursors to Julius Wellhausen, the father of modern biblical criticism. He claims that at its core midrash is a critical enterprise, written by rabbis who believed that there are irreconcilable contradictions in the Torah. As a solution they offer robust non-literal reinterpretations. [Therefore, Brandes claims], the rabbis believed that nothing in the Bible needs to be taken literally. They contend that the Torah’s grammar, terms, and even its core narrative could be reinterpreted to be read in an abstract and allegorical fashion.

Although the argument is creative and courageous, one wonders whether it is not perhaps overstated. Tradition did not see [the most radical] examples [cited by Brandes] as paradigmatic but instead viewed them as isolated cases where the rabbis, the sanctioned interpreters of the Torah, were entitled to reinterpret exceptional verses or texts that they thought needed to be reread. However, to see their project as a carte blanche to reject the literal meaning of formative religious narratives is, to say the least, a stretch.

Rabbi David Bigman takes a different tack. He builds a convincing case that the rabbis had a preference for some parts of the Bible. He infers from the lineup of “important” texts that those that are not on the list are non-essential to the tradition and can therefore be denuded of their [claims to] historicity. [But] the fact that the rabbis saw some aspects of the Pentateuch as being particularly important does not imply that the other parts can be discarded as irrelevant.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.