The main way ḥaredi men identify themselves to outsiders and to one another is by wearing a brimmed black hat. For many Ḥasidim, such hats are replaced by fur ones on Sabbaths and other special occasion. For non-Ḥasidim, the gold-standard of haberdashery is the broad-brimmed fedora manufactured by the Italian firm Borsalino. Bill Motchan delves into its history, and how it became a symbol of Jewish religious devotion:

The Borsalino hat brand began as a small workshop owned by Giuseppe Borsalino. At age sixteen, Guiseppe headed for Paris to study fashion. He dreamt of returning to Italy as a certified master hatter. He eventually opened a large factory in Alessandria. By 1914, production at the Borsalino factory rose to two million hats per year.

The company grew over the decades but continued to focus on quality. It takes nearly six months and over 50 operations to create one hat. The creation of a Borsalino is decidedly old-school. In fact, two of the original machines used by the Borsalino family in 1857 are still churning out hats. The process begins with Belgian rabbit fur, magically transformed into smooth felt. A Borsalino is primarily handmade. . . .

Long before the Borsalino became the hat of choice among Jews, it achieved popularity in Hollywood. Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman wore them in Casablanca. Jean-Paul Belmondo and Marcello Mastroianni wore Borsalinos. Fred Astaire, Winston Churchill, and Ernest Hemingway favored the hat, too. Al Pacino—as Michael Corleone—wore one. So did the real-life mobster Al Capone.

How it became associated with Orthodox Jews remains something a mystery, although Motchan interviews a rabbi with a theory.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.