At the end of June, New York City educational authorities announced that an investigation had found that eighteen ḥasidic schools had failed to meet educational requirements. But if these schools are really so bad—asks Frieda Vizel, herself a former member of the Satmar ḥasidic community in Williamsburg, Brooklyn—why do parents keep enrolling their children? There are many reasons, she contends, beginning with the fact that, in a community where families are large, the schools “take on the task of easing the burden for parents” as well as “seek to address students’ emotional needs.” And that is sometimes hard for outsiders to appreciate:

It is an irony of the current debate that liberals who believe in strong social safety nets, who would balk at the assertion that a person should be judged by his wealth or career attainment, and who once celebrated the maxim made famous by Hillary Clinton, “It takes a village to raise a child,” seem incapable of appreciating those same values when they come from religious communities.

But the critical reports from the New York Times and from the Department of Education don’t focus on the ways these schools serve as vital organs to ḥasidic communities. Instead, they focus on what the ḥasidic schools don’t do: they do not prepare the boys to be efficient workers and reliable consumers inside of mainstream, secular economic arrangements. And this is true. Ḥasidic schools don’t do the kind of career prep that can help students become future brand managers, corporate tax consultants, or equity administrators. It seems that in the wider world, people are so used to conflating education with economic preparation—because this is what modern education has become—that they assume that ḥasidic schools seek to do the same.

Yet, Vizel goes on to explain, most graduates of these schools immediately enter the workforce, and New York’s Ḥasidim usually provide opportunities for young people to learn on the job in family businesses. As for the discontents:

All of this doesn’t mean that ḥasidic parents don’t have criticisms of their sons’ schools. In fact, I believe the debate over ḥasidic education stems, in part, from internal frustrations. As someone who is on the periphery, parents talk to me candidly about the things that bother them. Plenty have complaints about education, as parents will have anywhere, and I hear especially about the state of “English” for boys. . . . But at the same time, these parents value the many things they do get from the schools, and would by no means want the good to go away.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”