In the past half-century, the subject of modesty (in Hebrew, tsni’ut), and, in particular, feminine modesty, has become a major preoccupation in some Orthodox circles, and a major flashpoint for intra-Orthodox debate. Reviewing a collection of writings on the subject, Sarah Rindner turns to an unlikely source: the scholar of political theory Allan Bloom:

For Bloom modesty does not erase sexuality but quite the opposite. It relates to the life force, to our potential as human beings to procreate and generate life. By extending the existence of sexual differentiation to every aspect of life, tsni’ut reminds both men and women of their ultimate purpose in relation to one another. A woman wearing a skirt in an environment where everyone else is wearing slacks is not necessarily expressing her interiority, her dignity, or her commitment to Judaism, [as various apologists for tsni’ut contend]. She is also simply reminding herself and others that she is a woman, and there are some things that are more important than productivity in the marketplace.

The fact that modesty in practice is uncomfortable, unfair, and imbalanced is not a quirk of the system but a feature. While a complete absence of modesty might make sexual gratification easier to attain in the short term, it ultimately serves to deflate eros and desire. In a world that seeks to reduce our sexual interactions to the most banal transactions, the strictures of modesty remind us of their potency and power.

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.