How to interpret the work of the towering Jewish thinker Moses Maimonides was the subject of a great debate between two of the 20th century’s foremost Jewish scholars: the political theorist Leo Strauss of the University of Chicago, and the medievalist (and hasidic rebbe) Isadore Twersky of Harvard. In this fascinating analysis, Warren Zev Harvey outlines the terms of the debate and makes the case for why Twersky was right:

Leo Strauss . . . presumed an irreparable conflict between Maimonides the rabbi and Maimonides the philosopher, and concluded that the true Maimonides was Maimonides the philosopher. [By contrast, the Israeli philosopher] Yeshayahu Leibowitz . . . agreed with Strauss that there is an irreparable conflict between Maimonides the rabbi and Maimonides the philosopher, but concluded, contrary to Strauss, that the true Maimonides was Maimonides the rabbi.

Twersky, Harvey explains, rejected both approaches, as well as the “supposedly uncontroversial position of most of the Maimonidean scholars at the time, who spoke of Maimonides’ having made a ‘synthesis’ of Judaism and philosophy.”

The key word to understanding Twersky’s approach is “integration.” “Integration” and “synthesis” are not synonyms. In a synthesis, the thesis and antithesis are replaced by something new, the synthesis. The synthesis supersedes the thesis and the antithesis, rendering them both anachronistic. The synthesis of black and white is: gray. In an integration, however, all elements remain true to themselves. Black remains black, white remains white.

Maimonides, Twersky insisted, did not compromise halakhah for philosophy or philosophy for halakhah. His goal was not to turn black and white into gray. His Maimonides was committed uncompromisingly to Jewish law, that is, halakhah; but he was simultaneously committed uncompromisingly to Reason, that is, philosophy.

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.