How to interpret the work of the towering Jewish thinker Moses Maimonides was the subject of a great debate between two of the 20th century’s foremost Jewish scholars: the political theorist Leo Strauss of the University of Chicago, and the medievalist (and hasidic rebbe) Isadore Twersky of Harvard. In this fascinating analysis, Warren Zev Harvey outlines the terms of the debate and makes the case for why Twersky was right:

Leo Strauss . . . presumed an irreparable conflict between Maimonides the rabbi and Maimonides the philosopher, and concluded that the true Maimonides was Maimonides the philosopher. [By contrast, the Israeli philosopher] Yeshayahu Leibowitz . . . agreed with Strauss that there is an irreparable conflict between Maimonides the rabbi and Maimonides the philosopher, but concluded, contrary to Strauss, that the true Maimonides was Maimonides the rabbi.

Twersky, Harvey explains, rejected both approaches, as well as the “supposedly uncontroversial position of most of the Maimonidean scholars at the time, who spoke of Maimonides’ having made a ‘synthesis’ of Judaism and philosophy.”

The key word to understanding Twersky’s approach is “integration.” “Integration” and “synthesis” are not synonyms. In a synthesis, the thesis and antithesis are replaced by something new, the synthesis. The synthesis supersedes the thesis and the antithesis, rendering them both anachronistic. The synthesis of black and white is: gray. In an integration, however, all elements remain true to themselves. Black remains black, white remains white.

Maimonides, Twersky insisted, did not compromise halakhah for philosophy or philosophy for halakhah. His goal was not to turn black and white into gray. His Maimonides was committed uncompromisingly to Jewish law, that is, halakhah; but he was simultaneously committed uncompromisingly to Reason, that is, philosophy.

On Yom Kippur, Hizballah fired over 200 rockets and drones at Israel, with one drone hitting a retirement home in Herzliya, miraculously without casualties. Yesterday, however, proved less lucky: a drone launched by the Iran-backed group struck a military base, killing four and injuring another 58, about twenty moderately or seriously.

This attack reflects Iranian strategy: Israeli defensive systems are strong, but so are Iranian drones and missiles, and with enough attacks some will get through. As Ariel Kahana writes, such an approach is consistent with Tehran’s desire to fight a war of attrition, denying Jerusalem the chance to strike a decisive blow. Kahana explains how the IDF might turn the tables:

It’s worth noting that Iran’s strategy of wearing down Israel and other U.S. allies in the region is not merely a choice, but a necessity. Militarily, it’s the only card left in Tehran’s hand. Iran neither desires nor possesses the capability to deploy ground forces against Israel, given the vast geographical distance and intervening countries. Moreover, while Israel boasts one of the world’s most formidable air forces, Iran’s air capabilities are comparatively limited.

Israel’s trump card in this high-stakes game is its unparalleled air-defense system. For years, Iran had counted on its network of proxy organizations to provide a protective umbrella against Western strikes. However, a year into the current conflict, this strategy lies in tatters: Hamas is reeling, Hizballah is on the back foot, and the various militias in Iraq and Yemen amount to little more than an irritant for Israel. The result? Iran finds itself unexpectedly exposed.

And when it comes to direct attacks on Israel, Iran’s options may be limited. Its October 1 attack, which used its sophisticated Fateh-2 missiles, was more effective than that in April, but not much more so:

Oded Eilam, drawing on his experience as a former senior Mossad official, . .  estimates [Iran’s] stockpile of these advanced weapons is limited to between 400 and 800. With 200 already expended in a single attack, Iran’s reserves of truly effective missiles may be running low. This raises a critical question: can Iran sustain a prolonged ballistic exchange with Israel? The numbers suggest it’s capacity for attrition warfare may be more limited than it would like to admit.