Spokesmen for the U.S. State Department did not hesitate to condemn Israel for its alleged lack of “restraint” or “proportionality” during the Gaza war. Now, as the U.S. steps up its bombing campaign against Islamic State, is the American military being held to a higher standard? Although the Pentagon has not publicized any estimates of civilian casualties, it is unlikely the air force is sending text messages to warn of impending missile strikes. How to explain the State Department’s hutzpah? Roger L. Simon has an answer:

It’s easier (safer) to attack the Jewish state, which is democratic and often wildly self-critical, than it is to be honest with totalitarians who are truly dangerous. And when you criticize Israel, to justify your behavior to yourself, you then have to make yourself believe something is genuinely wrong with it, just as wrong as with the Middle Eastern countries that surround it where torture, misogyny, and murder are commonplace. This is the process that goes on in our State Department and administration and has for a long time. It’s a kind of low-rent version of the old saying, “Europe will never forgive the Jews for Auschwitz.”

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.