When Benjamin Netanyahu told the UN that he believes in “two states for two peoples based on mutual recognition,” his real intended audience was the Arab states, argues Haviv Rettig Gur. And for good reason. While the Palestinian leadership remains wedded to the two equally failed strategies of terrorism (Hamas) and international isolation of Israel (Mahmoud Abbas), Arab rulers are turning elsewhere. Although still paying lip service to the longstanding mantra that peace with Israel has to wait upon Palestinian statehood, they are also showing readiness to ignore it. As Gur amplifies:

The emir of Qatar, Sheik Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who was Hamas’s key funder and patron in last summer’s conflict, told CNN last week that his country was open to reviving relations with Israel (a low-level diplomatic office was shut in 2009 during that year’s Gaza conflict)—“as long as they are serious in making peace and providing and protecting the Palestinian people.”

Indeed, the strongest rejection of the idea came from those who are already largely committed to it. “Chances for such alliance [with Israel] are nearly nonexistent,” said Sameh Seif al-Yazal, a former Egyptian intelligence official who is close to President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi—strong words for a country that has a formal peace treaty with Israel, intimate security cooperation, and eagerly aids Israel in the blockade of Hamas-ruled Gaza. And the United States, too, may be shifting in light of the new reality.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.