Turkey's "Palestine Fetish": More Bark than Bite

In recent years, Turkey has become one of the most vocal supporters of the Palestinian cause, trying to break the Gaza blockade with a flotilla, providing safe haven and funds to senior Hamas operatives, shrilly condemning the Jewish state, and eroding the longstanding and important Turkish-Israeli alliance. But, argues the Turkish journalist Burak Bekdil, President Erdogan rarely puts his country’s money where its mouth is. This is because, historically, the Turkish government has always cared much less about the Palestinian people than about the near-magical political value of the Palestinian cause:

“The Palestinian cause” is a unique charm that brings together Turks from different ideologies. Turkish Islamists view it as an indispensable part of “jihad”; the conservatives feel attached to it because it has a religious connotation; for the leftists it is part of an “anti-imperialist” struggle; the nationalists embrace it just because most Turks embrace it. In the 1970s, when a dozen Turks a day on average were being killed in street violence, the “Palestinian cause” was the only issue that otherwise warring fractions of the Turkish left, right, and Islamists could agree on.

Read more at Gatestone

More about: Palestinians, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey

If Iran Goes Nuclear, the U.S. Will Be Forced Out of the Middle East

The International Atomic Energy Agency reported in May that Iran has, or is close to having, enough highly enriched uranium to build multiple atomic bombs, while, according to other sources, it is taking steps toward acquiring the technology to assemble such weapons. Considering the effects on Israel, the Middle East, and American foreign policy of a nuclear-armed Iran, Eli Diamond writes:

The basic picture is that the Middle East would become inhospitable to the U.S. and its allies when Iran goes nuclear. Israel would find itself isolated, with fewer options for deterring Iran or confronting its proxies. The Saudis and Emiratis would be forced into uncomfortable compromises.

Any course reversal has to start by recognizing that the United States has entered the early stages of a global conflict in which the Middle East is set to be a main attraction, not a sideshow.

Directly or not, the U.S. is engaged in this conflict and has a significant stake in its outcome. In Europe, American and Western arms are the only things standing between Ukraine and its defeat at the hands of Russia. In the Middle East, American arms remain indispensable to Israel’s survival as it wages a defensive, multifront war against Iran and its proxies Hamas and Hizballah. In the Indo-Pacific, China has embarked on the greatest military buildup since World War II, its eyes set on Taiwan but ultimately U.S. primacy.

While Iran is the smallest of these three powers, China and Russia rely on it greatly for oil and weapons, respectively. Both rely on it as a tool to degrade America’s position in the region. Constraining Iran and preventing its nuclear breakout would keep waterways open for Western shipping and undermine a key node in the supply chain for China and Russia.

Diamond offers a series of concrete suggestions for how the U.S. could push back hard against Iran, among them expanding the Abraham Accords into a military and diplomatic alliance that would include Saudi Arabia. But such a plan depends on Washington recognizing that its interests in Eastern Europe, in the Pacific, and in the Middle East are all connected.

Read more at National Review

More about: Iran nuclear program, Israeli Security, Middle East, U.S. Foreign policy