This year, the Shiite holiday of Ashura coincided with another Iranian national holiday: the anniversary of the takeover of the American embassy on November 4, 1979. Iranian leaders used the occasion to make clear their attitudes toward Israel and the United States and thereby respond indirectly to President Obama’s fourth personal letter to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. The following excerpt, introduced and translated by A. Savyon, Y. Mansharof, and E. Kharazi, is from an interview with Ahmad Khatami, a close associate of Khamenei:

As Western [officials] say, “Even if the nuclear issue is resolved, the other issues will remain.” We too say that even if the nuclear issue is resolved, we will continue to say “Death to America,” because this motto is anchored in our faith. The Western side is the symbol of arrogance, and the motto “There is no God but Allah” is the repudiation of the arrogance. . . . This year, the chant of “Death to America” will be more fundamental and more profound than in previous years. . . . The claim that we use religious slogans to preserve the regime is wrong. The Iranian nation uses mottos from Islam and the Quran properly and appropriately. . . . Those who misunderstand [the religion] and are passive vis-à-vis America [i.e., Iran’s pragmatic camp] call this passivity wise. But it is not wise. It is humiliating. . . . The mottos “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” are taken from the tenets of the religion.

On Yom Kippur, Hizballah fired over 200 rockets and drones at Israel, with one drone hitting a retirement home in Herzliya, miraculously without casualties. Yesterday, however, proved less lucky: a drone launched by the Iran-backed group struck a military base, killing four and injuring another 58, about twenty moderately or seriously.

This attack reflects Iranian strategy: Israeli defensive systems are strong, but so are Iranian drones and missiles, and with enough attacks some will get through. As Ariel Kahana writes, such an approach is consistent with Tehran’s desire to fight a war of attrition, denying Jerusalem the chance to strike a decisive blow. Kahana explains how the IDF might turn the tables:

It’s worth noting that Iran’s strategy of wearing down Israel and other U.S. allies in the region is not merely a choice, but a necessity. Militarily, it’s the only card left in Tehran’s hand. Iran neither desires nor possesses the capability to deploy ground forces against Israel, given the vast geographical distance and intervening countries. Moreover, while Israel boasts one of the world’s most formidable air forces, Iran’s air capabilities are comparatively limited.

Israel’s trump card in this high-stakes game is its unparalleled air-defense system. For years, Iran had counted on its network of proxy organizations to provide a protective umbrella against Western strikes. However, a year into the current conflict, this strategy lies in tatters: Hamas is reeling, Hizballah is on the back foot, and the various militias in Iraq and Yemen amount to little more than an irritant for Israel. The result? Iran finds itself unexpectedly exposed.

And when it comes to direct attacks on Israel, Iran’s options may be limited. Its October 1 attack, which used its sophisticated Fateh-2 missiles, was more effective than that in April, but not much more so:

Oded Eilam, drawing on his experience as a former senior Mossad official, . .  estimates [Iran’s] stockpile of these advanced weapons is limited to between 400 and 800. With 200 already expended in a single attack, Iran’s reserves of truly effective missiles may be running low. This raises a critical question: can Iran sustain a prolonged ballistic exchange with Israel? The numbers suggest it’s capacity for attrition warfare may be more limited than it would like to admit.