Josephus, before becoming the great Jewish historian of the first century, led Jewish rebels against the Romans in defense of Jerusalem. But after the battle was lost, he surrendered to the Romans and won the favor of Rome, living out the rest of his life there as a successful writer. His story has led many to see him as a traitor to his people and his work as thinly disguised Roman propaganda. William den Hollander argues that this reading is mistaken (free registration required):

One of the key contributors to the negative assessment of Josephus’ character, which has also affected the manner in which his narratives have been read, has been the scholarly and popular misunderstanding of his relationship with the Roman generals/emperors. The traditional view has been that Josephus served as an imperial lackey and that his writings, in particular the Jewish War, were nothing more than works of propaganda advancing the interests of the imperial throne. Since the early 1980s, however, this view has been increasingly questioned by experts. By close examination of his narratives and careful contextualization of Josephus and his writings within ancient society, scholars have begun to recognize that his relationship with the emperors was not quite as close as had been assumed (or, perhaps, as close as Josephus wished to have us believe) and that, furthermore, his narratives do not quite fit the characteristic of propaganda. In fact, they are at times quite the opposite.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.