Understanding Netanyahu’s Security Policy

Former Israeli ambassador to the UN Dore Gold speaks about the possibility of renewed negotiations with the Palestinians, Israel’s relations with Arab countries, the Iranian nuclear threat, and the absurdity of the attack on Netanyahu for accepting an invitation to speak to the U.S. Congress. On the subject of borders, Gold comments:

Many people forget that Israel was never required to withdraw to the 1949 armistice lines—which are often misnamed “the 1967 borders.” It was the UN Security Council Resolution 242, adopted in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, which stated explicitly that Israel was expected to withdraw from “territories” and not from all the territories. The common understanding of the U.S. and the UK at the time was that there had to be an Israeli withdrawal, but it wouldn’t have to be a full withdrawal. . . . Israel received assurances from successive US administrations that it was entitled to defensible borders that would replace the fragile pre-1967 lines from which it was attacked more than 40 years ago. . . .

Israel has to negotiate a new border with the Palestinians. . . . In the context of negotiating those new borders, Israel will seek ways to assure that, at the end of the day, it will have secure boundaries that are defensible, given the multiple threats mushrooming around Israel at present, from Islamic State to Iran.

Read more at Fathom

More about: Benjamin Netanyahu, Dore Gold, Iranian nuclear program, Israeli Security, Palestinians

Hizballah Is Learning Israel’s Weak Spots

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Hizballah, Iron Dome, Israeli Security