In 2007, Israeli planes destroyed a nuclear reactor in Syria that was a near-exact replica of a North Korean one and was manned by North Korean technicians; Iran’s most sophisticated missiles are variants of North Korean models; some of Syria’s chemical weapons were most likely developed with North Korean help as well. With Washington-Pyongyang talks expected to take place in the near future, writes Jay Solomon, the U.S. must pressure the Communist regime to cease providing such deadly weapons to rogue regimes:

On March 21, the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security released a report calling for UN inspectors to visit a site near the western Syrian town of al-Qusayr, noting that the Assad regime may have built a uranium-enrichment facility there with Pyongyang’s assistance. . . . In a [separate], confidential report, UN inspectors describe how North Korean trade companies smuggled tons of industrial equipment into Syria in recent years for what appeared to be the construction of a new chemical-weapons production facility. . . .

U.S. defense officials are also worried that the North Koreans are learning from the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons, perhaps in case they need to resort to chemical attacks if conflict breaks out on the Korean peninsula. Washington believes that Pyongyang is more than willing to use such weapons, claiming that VX nerve agent was the instrument of choice when Kim Jong Un ordered the assassination of his half-brother last year in Malaysia. . . .

North Korea and Iran have been cooperating on missile development since the 1980s, according to U.S. and Israeli officials. . . . To date, however, U.S., European, and UN officials say there is no smoking-gun evidence of nuclear cooperation between the two countries. . . .

According to current and former U.S. officials, however, it is unclear what the administration could offer Pyongyang in return for cutting off one of the country’s primary revenue sources. To be sure, North Korea is eager to roll back the punishing international sanctions, particularly those targeting its mineral and agricultural exports. . . . [But] the suspected depths of North Korea’s economic ills mean that Kim will likely continue marketing his wares to bad actors in the Middle East, unless President Trump proves willing or able to offer him a sufficiently enticing alternative.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.