A recent article in the official organ of Islamic State (IS) castigated Muslims in general, and Hizballah and al-Qaeda in particular, for giving undue attention to the struggle to destroy Israel. After all, its author notes, there’s a whole world filled with infidels against whom jihad can be waged. The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) provides some excerpts in English:

For decades, the issue of Palestine and its occupation by the Jews has dominated the lives of Muslims the world over. The exaggerators have exceeded in stressing its importance, and the merchants have traded in it—to the point where most people came to believe that Palestine is the Muslims’ primary cause. This is after the [secular Arab] nationalists declared it to be the Muslims’ top priority, and [vowed] that no other issue should be raised until Palestine was liberated, so as not to diversify efforts or waste capabilities. Moreover, many believe that there is no room for jihad [anywhere] but in Palestine. . . .

After nearly seven decades of empty slogans, Palestine is still ruled by the Jews. . . . Allah ordered worshippers to fight all the infidels, without exception. . . . [R]estricting jihad to the Jews alone . . . is an alteration of Allah’s law, and constitutes following the delusions of the [secular Arab rulers] who seek to prevent Muslims from waging jihad against the polytheists and infidels in the countries that they themselves control.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.