A recent article in the official organ of Islamic State (IS) castigated Muslims in general, and Hizballah and al-Qaeda in particular, for giving undue attention to the struggle to destroy Israel. After all, its author notes, there’s a whole world filled with infidels against whom jihad can be waged. The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) provides some excerpts in English:

For decades, the issue of Palestine and its occupation by the Jews has dominated the lives of Muslims the world over. The exaggerators have exceeded in stressing its importance, and the merchants have traded in it—to the point where most people came to believe that Palestine is the Muslims’ primary cause. This is after the [secular Arab] nationalists declared it to be the Muslims’ top priority, and [vowed] that no other issue should be raised until Palestine was liberated, so as not to diversify efforts or waste capabilities. Moreover, many believe that there is no room for jihad [anywhere] but in Palestine. . . .

After nearly seven decades of empty slogans, Palestine is still ruled by the Jews. . . . Allah ordered worshippers to fight all the infidels, without exception. . . . [R]estricting jihad to the Jews alone . . . is an alteration of Allah’s law, and constitutes following the delusions of the [secular Arab rulers] who seek to prevent Muslims from waging jihad against the polytheists and infidels in the countries that they themselves control.

While roughly a third of Saudis are willing to cooperate with the Jewish state in matters of technology and commerce, far fewer are willing to allow Israeli teams to compete within the kingdom—let alone support diplomatic normalization. These are just a few results of a recent, detailed, and professional opinion survey—a rarity in Saudi Arabia—that has much bearing on current negotiations involving Washington, Jerusalem, and Riyadh. David Pollock notes some others:

When asked about possible factors “in considering whether or not Saudi Arabia should establish official relations with Israel,” the Saudi public opts first for an Islamic—rather than a specifically Saudi—agenda: almost half (46 percent) say it would be “important” to obtain “new Israeli guarantees of Muslim rights at al-Aqsa Mosque and al-Haram al-Sharif [i.e., the Temple Mount] in Jerusalem.” Prioritizing this issue is significantly more popular than any other option offered. . . .

This popular focus on religion is in line with responses to other controversial questions in the survey. Exactly the same percentage, for example, feel “strongly” that “our country should cut off all relations with any other country where anybody hurts the Quran.”

By comparison, Palestinian aspirations come in second place in Saudi popular perceptions of a deal with Israel. Thirty-six percent of the Saudi public say it would be “important” to obtain “new steps toward political rights and better economic opportunities for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.” Far behind these drivers in popular attitudes, surprisingly, are hypothetical American contributions to a Saudi-Israel deal—even though these have reportedly been under heavy discussion at the official level in recent months.

Therefore, based on this analysis of these new survey findings, all three governments involved in a possible trilateral U.S.-Saudi-Israel deal would be well advised to pay at least as much attention to its religious dimension as to its political, security, and economic ones.