During the Iranian attack last Saturday, Jordanian jets took to the skies to shoot down munitions aimed at Israel, bringing into stark relief the contradictions in the country’s foreign policy. Lahav Harkov explains:

If anyone thought Jordan’s part in intercepting drones Iran launched at Israel on the weekend marked a turning point in the Hashemite kingdom’s relations with the Jewish state, the Jordanian foreign minister Ayman Safadi immediately tried to dispel that notion, insisting in media interviews that Israel was still the real problem.

Leading figures in Jordan have for months been leveling harsh criticism on Israel and Amman called off an energy and water deal in response to the war in Gaza, amid pressure from a population that has largely been unsupportive of relations between the countries since they signed an agreement in 1994.

The kingdom realizes, however, that it is dependent on Israel and the U.S. for its own security—and, like any country, doesn’t relish its airspace being violated by a hostile power. And there is no doubt that is what Iran is:

Iran has long worked to gain a foothold in Jordan and to undermine the stability of its monarchy. Israel’s 300 km-border with Jordan is its longest frontier, such that a stronger Iranian or Iran-backed presence would pose a serious threat to the Jewish state. . . . A week before the missile and drone attack on Israel, Iranian media reported that Hizballah is ready to arm 12,000 “Islamist resistance” fighters in Jordan to overthrow the monarchy.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.