On Monday, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its most recent report on the Islamic Republic’s compliance with the 2015 nuclear agreement, which lists numerous breaches. The report follows on Tehran’s recent announcement that it has begun enriching uranium up to 5 percent, ignoring the 3.67-percent cap to which it committed itself in 2015. Moreover, the IAEA confirmed Israel’s finding that Iran is storing uranium at a previously undisclosed site. David Albright and Andrea Stricker summarize and analyze these findings and others:

Iran . . . started uranium enrichment at the Fordow fuel-enrichment plant; increased its quantity of low-enriched uranium above the 300kg cap, ramping up monthly production significantly; [and] increased the number and type of centrifuges enriching uranium above the limit of 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges. The total . . . uranium enrichment has increased [to] 36 percent above the enrichment capacity allowed. . . . Iran [also] installed and operated several new, advanced centrifuge types at the [Fordow reactor] not listed as permitted for installation in the nuclear deal.

The breakout time, or the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough [highly enriched] uranium for a nuclear weapon, has shifted downward, . . . from about eight-to-twelve months to six-to-ten months. The breakout time will decrease further as Iran increases its stock of enriched uranium and installs more centrifuges.

Iran is [therefore] increasing its enrichment capacity and its experience in operating advanced centrifuges. While the former is reversible, the latter is not. This knowledge and experience cannot be lost.

Albright and Stricker also note several points the IAEA report overlooks:

The report does not discuss Iran’s denial of access to an inspector at its Natanz [nuclear facility, and] is completely silent on the issue of the IAEA’s investigation of the nuclear archive [discovered last year by the Mossad], and whether this matter could rise to the level of a violation of the nuclear deal itself, under which Iran committed “under no circumstances ever [to] seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons.” The existence of the archive may also violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Iran’s safeguards agreements.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.