Born into a wealthy ḥasidic family, Asher Ginsberg (1856-1927)—better known by his pen name Aḥad Ha’am—rejected religious belief as a youth but remained deeply committed to preserving Jewish tradition and the Jewish nation. Thanks to his convictions and his profuse literary talent, he became the leader of the Russian Zionist movement and one of the era’s most compelling and profound Hebrew essayists. Allan Arkush discusses what Aḥad Ha’am saw as the twin problems confronting the Jews of his day: on the one hand, the material threats of poverty and persecution faced by East European Jews and, on the other hand, the threat of assimilation and deracination faced by those in the West. (Interview by Eric Cohen. Audio, 42 minutes.)
A Great Zionist Thinker on the Jews’ Moral and Material Crisis
Israel Agreed Not to Retaliate During the Persian Gulf War—and Paid a Price for It
During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Saddam Hussein fired 39 Scud missiles at Israel, killing one person and causing extensive property damage. Under intense pressure from the first Bush administration to sit still—ostensibly because Israeli involvement in the war could lead Arab states to abandon the White House’s anti-Iraq coalition—Jerusalem refrained from retaliating. Moshe Arens, who was the Israeli defense minister at the time, comments on the decision in light of information recently made public:
[W]hat was George H.W. Bush thinking [in urging Israel not to respond]? His secretary of state, James Baker, had accompanied the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Charles (Chas) Freeman, on a visit to King Fahd in Riyadh on November 2, 1990, two-and-a-half months before the beginning of the war, to obtain the king’s approval for additional deployment of U.S. troops in his kingdom in preparation for the attack on Iraq.
He was told by the king that although they would not welcome Israeli participation in the war, he understood that Israel could not stand idly by if it were attacked by Iraq. If Israel were to defend itself, the Saudi armed forces would still fight on America’s side, the king told Baker. So much for the danger to the coalition if Israel were to respond to the Scud attacks. Israel was not informed of this Saudi position.
So why was President Bush so intent on keeping Israel out of the war? It seems that he took the position, so dominant in the American foreign-policy establishment, that America’s primary interest in the Middle East was the maintenance of good relations with the Arab world, and that the Arab world attached great importance to the Palestinian problem, and that as long as that problem was not resolved Israel remained an encumbrance to the U.S.-Arab relationship. If Israel were to appear as an ally of the U.S. in the war against Iraq, that was likely to damage the image the U.S. was trying to project to the Arabs.
In fact, immediately upon the conclusion of the war against Saddam Hussein, Baker launched a diplomatic effort that culminated in the Madrid Conference in the hope that it would lead to a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It didn’t. . . .