Last week, the State Department announced it was “deeply concerned” by Israel’s decision to allow new homes to be built in east Jerusalem. Elliott Abrams dissects the document, pointing to its misleading use of statistics and disregard of the fact that in any potential peace deal, Israel will be keeping the areas where the new houses are to be built. Then he gets to the real problem:

Checking the State Department’s website, I find no similar five-paragraph attacks or critiques on any subject. It seems nothing is as dangerous to the world as construction in Israel and in settlements. . . .

Who is the intended audience for this attack on Israel? If the answer is Israelis and their government, [the attack] will fail due to its refusal to make logical distinctions. If the answer is Americans, including members of Congress, then this attack—launched by a lame-duck administration during the week of the Democratic convention—will have zero effect.

So here’s a theory: the intended audience is European governments, and others around the world. This kind of assault makes their own assaults on Israel easier: they can see us and raise us in the level of criticism of Israel. They can be encouraged in planning attacks on Israel in the UN General Assembly in September. They can offer six-paragraph screeds where they explain how these new housing units threaten peace, security, and the two-state solution.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.