Surveying the relationship between ground and air combat in Israeli strategy from the War of Independence until the present, and examining the threats currently facing the Jewish state, Eado Hecht and Eitan Shamir argue that Israel is overly reliant on airpower and long-range artillery, and needs to expand its ability to operate on land. In particular, they see the IDF as unready for “medium-intensity warfare” with organizations like Hizballah, Nusra Front, or Islamic State (IS). There is also the very real possibility that Hamas could imitate IS or Nusra Front tactics by trying to conduct large-scale, simultaneous raids deep into Israeli territory:

[O]ver the past five years, the IDF has disbanded six armored brigades, two artillery brigades, and an undisclosed number of rear-area security battalions—one more step in an ongoing, drastic decrease of ground-force combat power. When viewed in conjunction with statements by senior officers expressing doubt as to the net worth of offensive ground operations, these reductions cast doubt on the seriousness of the military’s commitment to conducting them. . . .

In [response to possible attacks by Hamas, Hizballah, or other organizations], the Israeli government might be compelled to order a ground offensive. . . . [T]o conduct an effective ground operation, the IDF will need the tactical capability to cross, clear, and cover large tracts of ground, some of it hilly and wooded; capture and clear numerous built-up areas of various sizes; and search for tunnels and other hidden storage sites—and do it all while being fired at by mortars and long-range anti-tank missiles, ambushed by infantry with small arms and personal anti-tank rockets, mines, booby-traps, and remote-controlled explosives, and counter-attacked by infantry units as well as suicide bombers and suicide-bomber vehicles while overcoming a variety of natural and artificial obstacles.

[T]he IDF was surprised in Lebanon in 2006 and in Gaza in 2014 by the intensity of enemy resistance. In future, the IDF must assume this level of resistance at a minimum. Actually, as potential enemies are gaining considerable combat experience, an even higher level of intensity and competence should be assumed. Even though Israel’s current enemies are not as big, well-armed, or well-trained as the Egyptian and former Syrian armies, they must be considered not merely as guerrillas but as trained armies. To defeat them will require the application of regular-warfare tactics adapted to the specific circumstances.

All this, write Hecht and Shamir, will require significantly larger ground forces than Israel can presently field.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.