Surveying the relationship between ground and air combat in Israeli strategy from the War of Independence until the present, and examining the threats currently facing the Jewish state, Eado Hecht and Eitan Shamir argue that Israel is overly reliant on airpower and long-range artillery, and needs to expand its ability to operate on land. In particular, they see the IDF as unready for “medium-intensity warfare” with organizations like Hizballah, Nusra Front, or Islamic State (IS). There is also the very real possibility that Hamas could imitate IS or Nusra Front tactics by trying to conduct large-scale, simultaneous raids deep into Israeli territory:

[O]ver the past five years, the IDF has disbanded six armored brigades, two artillery brigades, and an undisclosed number of rear-area security battalions—one more step in an ongoing, drastic decrease of ground-force combat power. When viewed in conjunction with statements by senior officers expressing doubt as to the net worth of offensive ground operations, these reductions cast doubt on the seriousness of the military’s commitment to conducting them. . . .

In [response to possible attacks by Hamas, Hizballah, or other organizations], the Israeli government might be compelled to order a ground offensive. . . . [T]o conduct an effective ground operation, the IDF will need the tactical capability to cross, clear, and cover large tracts of ground, some of it hilly and wooded; capture and clear numerous built-up areas of various sizes; and search for tunnels and other hidden storage sites—and do it all while being fired at by mortars and long-range anti-tank missiles, ambushed by infantry with small arms and personal anti-tank rockets, mines, booby-traps, and remote-controlled explosives, and counter-attacked by infantry units as well as suicide bombers and suicide-bomber vehicles while overcoming a variety of natural and artificial obstacles.

[T]he IDF was surprised in Lebanon in 2006 and in Gaza in 2014 by the intensity of enemy resistance. In future, the IDF must assume this level of resistance at a minimum. Actually, as potential enemies are gaining considerable combat experience, an even higher level of intensity and competence should be assumed. Even though Israel’s current enemies are not as big, well-armed, or well-trained as the Egyptian and former Syrian armies, they must be considered not merely as guerrillas but as trained armies. To defeat them will require the application of regular-warfare tactics adapted to the specific circumstances.

All this, write Hecht and Shamir, will require significantly larger ground forces than Israel can presently field.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.