Al-Qaeda’s Iraqi branch renamed itself Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) and began distancing itself from its parent organization in 2006. It severed ties completely in 2014, when it declared a caliphate, violating orders from Osama bin Laden and his successors. Thanks to the CIA’s release of the trove of captured documents from bin Laden’s Pakistan redoubt, the relationship between the two terrorist groups, and bin Laden’s insights into the rival group’s vulnerabilities, have become clearer. Thomas Joscelyn writes:

[A]n initial review of the Abbottabad files suggests that bin Laden still considered the ISI to be part of his network at the time of his death. Regardless, bin Laden never would have approved of Islamic State’s caliphate declaration in 2014. . . .

“We need to fight in areas where we can gain points toward the creation of the caliphate-based state,” [wrote bin Laden and a deputy]. Yet “the enemy” could “easily destroy” any state lacking the “essential foundations to function and defend itself.” Although al-Qaeda viewed the United States as a weakened foe, the world’s only superpower was still strong enough to topple quickly both Saddam’s regime and the Taliban’s Islamic emirate. Bin Laden . . . warned that a newly declared caliphate would meet the same fate. . . . Bin Laden made a commonsense observation that resonates across many contexts: the “public does not like losers.” . . .

Despite its territorial setbacks, it is too early to pronounce total victory over Islamic State. As U.S. intelligence officials warned earlier this year, the organization likely retains enough personnel and resources to continue waging guerrilla warfare. And Islamic State’s fortunes are no longer confined to Iraq and Syria. Its enterprise is global, with representatives everywhere from West Africa to Southeast Asia. Its network in the West will also continue to bedevil European and American counterterrorism officials.

Still, bin Laden warned that the jihadists would not be able to hold onto their territory if they declared a caliphate. He was right. Al-Qaeda’s branches in Africa and the Middle East face their own hurdles, but they continue to follow his more patient approach. Time will tell if bin Laden’s longer-term plan for caliphate-building will bear fruit.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.