The acclaimed Irish writer Sally Rooney, whose 2018 novel Normal People was adapted as a television series by the BBC, recently rejected an Israeli publisher’s offer to bring out a Hebrew edition of her most latest book, citing her antipathy to the Jewish state. (She has not expressed any objections to her book being published in China, or any other country.) Erika Dreifus sees a lesson to be learned from a previous case of literary anti-Semitism, involving no less a figure than Charles Dickens. A recent children’s book by Nancy Churnin recounts this episode:

Eliza Davis (1817-1903) refused to be daunted when writing to the famous author, whose portrayal of “the Jew Fagin” in Oliver Twist landed “like a hammer on [her] heart,” as Churnin describes it. . . . Quoting the correspondence, Churnin conveys Davis’s message: Fagin “encouraged ‘a vile prejudice’” against her people. . . . In response, Dickens declared that Fagin was based on real-life Jewish criminals. . . .  Davis tried again; evidently, Dickens didn’t write back.

But the Jewish character in his next novel—the estimable Mr. Riah in Our Mutual Friend—was no Fagin.

While Fagin is a gangster who seduces children into a life of crime, Riah is a moneylender made into a scapegoat by his villainous Gentile boss—and in the book’s denouement proves his kindness and generosity.

After that novel appeared, Davis thanked Dickens for “a great compliment paid to myself and to my people.” This time, Dickens responded much more warmly. He went further, notably in a magazine essay in which he referred to Jews as “an earnest, methodical, aspiring people” and in changes to a subsequent printing of Oliver Twist, when he instructed the printer to remove many instances in which he referred to “the Jew” and to use Fagin’s name instead.

Eliza Davis’s reaction to Dickens’s words—her sense of betrayal by an admired author whose compassion somehow didn’t extend to Jews—mirrors my own increasingly frequent experience. . . . I don’t expect “great compliments to me and to my people” from authorial idols and colleagues. . . . All I’m seeking is fairness—and freedom from vile prejudice.

Why, ask many Israelis, can’t we just end the war, let our children, siblings, and spouses finally come home, and get out the hostages? Azar Gat seeks to answer this question by looking at the possible costs of concluding hostilities precipitously, and breaking down some of the more specific arguments put forward by those who have despaired of continuing military operations in Gaza. He points to the case of the second intifada, in which the IDF not only ended the epidemic of suicide bombing, but effectively convinced—through application of military force—Fatah and other Palestinian factions to cease their terror war.

“What we haven’t achieved militarily in Gaza after a year-and-a-half probably can’t be achieved.” Two years passed from the outbreak of the second intifada until the launch of Operation Defensive Shield, [whose aim was] to reoccupy the West Bank, and another two years until the intifada was fully suppressed. And all of that, then as now, was conducted against the background of a mostly hostile international community and with significant American constraints (together with critical assistance) on Israeli action. The Israeli chief of staff recently estimated that the intensified Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip would take about two months. Let’s hope that is the case.

The results of the [current] operation in [Gaza] and the breaking of Hamas’s grip on the supply routes may indeed pave the way for the entry of a non-Hamas Palestinian administration into the Strip—an arrangement that would necessarily need to be backed by Israeli bayonets, as in the West Bank. Any other end to the war will lead to Hamas’s recovery and its return to control of Gaza.

It is unclear how much Hamas was or would be willing to compromise on these figures in negotiations. But since the hostages are its primary bargaining chip, it has no incentive to compromise. On the contrary—it is interested in dragging out negotiations indefinitely, insisting on the full evacuation of the Gaza Strip and an internationally guaranteed cease-fire, to ensure its survival as Gaza’s de-facto ruler—a position that would also guarantee access to the flood of international aid destined for the Gaza Strip.

Once the hostages become the exclusive focus of discussion, Hamas dictates the rules. And since not only 251 or twenty hostages, but any number is considered worth “any price,” there is a real concern that Hamas will retain a certain number of captives as a long-term reserve.