In an attempt to discredit Zionism, the American leftist activist Lenni Brenner concocted an argument, first put forth in his 1983 Zionism in the Age of the Dictators, that Zionists and Nazis agreed on fundamental principles, that leaders of the Zionist movement collaborated with the Nazis to arrange for the deportation of German Jews, and that Zionist leaders intentionally abandoned European Jews to their fate. Brenner’s claims, which Paul Bogdanor shows to be utterly spurious, are frequently cited by anti-Semites on the far right and the far left—most recently in the claim of London’s ex-mayor Ken Livingstone that “Hitler was a Zionist.”

Brenner was not writing in a vacuum. For many years before the publication of Zionism in the Age of the Dictators, the Soviet bloc had been waging an anti-Semitic campaign with the same themes. . . .

Negotiations between the Labor Zionists and the Nazi regime began in 1933; at issue was the opportunity to help German Jews immigrate to Palestine without losing almost everything they had. . . . [T]he resulting Transfer Agreement caused intense public controversy within the Zionist movement. . . .

The moral dilemma facing the Labor Zionists was whether to help German Jews leave with a fraction of their funds or to join a futile boycott of Germany, which meant abandoning Jews and their assets to the Nazis. The Labor Zionists may be dismissed as naive for entering these talks, but their motives were not unreasonable.

Brenner, of course, saw the Zionists as evil. His trump card in his attack on the Transfer Agreement was the fact that two-thirds of German Jews seeking Palestine certificates in the years between 1933 and 1935 were turned down. However, as his [own] source pointed out, the Jewish Agency’s representatives were forced to reject these applications because of the British quota, which limited the number of immigration permits.

Brenner scorned as “capitalists” the thousands of desperate human beings who were rescued thanks to the agreement. In his opinion, it would have been better to forget about saving Germany’s Jewish population: “Every genuine opponent of Nazism understood that once Hitler had taken power and had German Jewry in his claws, the struggle against him could not possibly be curbed by an over-concern for their fate.” . . .

To Brenner, the Labor Zionists of the 1930s, who disagreed with his pronouncement made from the comfort of postwar America, were guilty of “boycott-scabbing and outright collaboration” with Hitler.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.