In 1903, a bitter dispute wracked the Zionist movement over whether to accept a British proposal to create a Jewish homeland in East Africa. Although the proposal is known to posterity as the Uganda plan, the area in question lies in modern-day Kenya. The Zionist Congress rejected the plan, but nonetheless a small Jewish community sprang up in Kenya around this time, as Yoḥai Ben-Gedalyah writes. (Pictures can be found at the link below.)

[W]hen the Nazis took power in Germany, [a number of] German Jews found themselves seeking refuge in places they never would have expected. Granted, the influx of Jews to Kenya was small, but that didn’t stop them from having to go through the British Colonial Office that was in charge of immigration to Kenya. In order to gain immigration status in Kenya, one had to be registered as a farm manager—[a requirement that] limited Jews’ ability to settle on the land. The local Jewish community worked hard to encourage Jewish immigration but found much resistance from white European settlers and from the Indian community in East Africa [as well as from] from the British Colonial Office. Obviously, the opinion of the indigenous black population was not considered.

While the Jews of Nairobi were working hard on the local immigration initiative, British Jewry in England started their own widespread settlement campaign for thousands of Jews to relocate from Europe to Kenyan farmlands. They would settle in [an area known as] the White Highlands, which had already been designated for colonial farms.

In August 1938 the British initiative was registered as a private company . . . under the title Plough Settlements Association, which had an initial capital of 25,000 pounds. One of the partners for the British company was the Jewish Colonization Association (known as the ICA), an organization that sought to settle European Jews in agricultural areas.

The initiative was presented as a colonial and financial enterprise; the hidden [goal] of rescuing Jews from the European continent was kept under wraps. The immigration activists met with established farmers in Kenya, the British Colonial Office officials, and other officials in order to study and ready the ground, and gain traction and support for the immigration initiative.

In the end, not much came out of these efforts.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.