From the 4th through the 7th century CE, several communities flourished in the southern desert of the Land of Israel, which were abandoned after the Islamic conquest in 635 CE. Archaeologists have recently uncovered and examined masses of animal bones in this area—not only of sheep and goats, but of crocodiles and other more exotic creatures—leading them to a clearer picture of its history. David Israel writes:

In the [pre-Byzantine] period, around the 3rd and 4th centuries CE, most of the bones found were of sheep, some of chickens, and almost none of wild animals. In the middle period, [during] the peak of Byzantine expansion, most of the bones are of goats with a few pig bones as well. At the close of the Byzantine period, the end of the 6th century and the beginning of the 7th, most of the bones again belong to sheep, but with a significant increase in pig bones and bones of wild animals. . . .

[The researchers] explain that sheep require a large amount of water and grazing land, and in the desert raising sheep usually means wandering among large grazing areas—suggesting a nomadic society that raises sheep for food or for commerce. Goats need less water and grazing space, so you should raise goats in the desert when you have cultivated agriculture and can’t wander. This [implies] a more stable economy.

According to these findings, before the flourishing of the Byzantine empire, Negev society was essentially nomadic, similar to the traditional Bedouin society. At the time of the Byzantine expansion, the economy of the Negev settlements grew stronger and they turn to large-scale agricultural crops. The return to a sheep-based economy in the middle of the 6th century shows once again that during this period the agricultural communities in the Negev were beginning to decline.

This disintegration was bound to reach deterioration: the abundance of wild animal bones indicates that the sheep were no longer sufficient for the inhabitants and so they started hunting wild animals. . . . Among the bones found during this period were those of a species of a large African antelope once common in the country, mainly on the coastal plain and the northern Negev. To date, researchers have assumed that this animal became extinct in this region in the 7th century BCE.

Robert Clark explains why the resumption of hostilities is both just and necessary:

These latest Israeli strikes come after weeks of consistent Palestinian provocation; they have repeatedly broken the terms of the cease-fire which they claimed they were so desperate for. There have been numerous [unsuccessful] bus bombings near Tel Aviv and Palestinian-instigated clashes in the West Bank. Fifty-nine Israeli hostages are still held in captivity.

In fact, Hamas and their Palestinian supporters . . . have always known that they can sit back, parade dead Israeli hostages live on social media, and receive hundreds of their own convicted terrorists and murderers back in return. They believed they could get away with the October 7 pogrom.

One hopes Hamas’s leaders will get the message. Meanwhile, many inside and outside Israel seem to believe that, by resuming the fighting, Jerusalem has given up on rescuing the remaining hostages. But, writes Ron Ben-Yishai, this assertion misunderstands the goals of the present campaign. “Experience within the IDF and Israeli intelligence,” Ben-Yishai writes, “has shown that such pressure is the most effective way to push Hamas toward flexibility.” He outlines two other aims:

The second objective was to signal to Hamas that Israel is not only targeting its military wing—the terror army that was the focus of previous phases of the war up until the last cease-fire—but also its governance structure. This was demonstrated by the targeted elimination of five senior officials from Hamas’s political and civilian administration. . . . The strikes also served as a message to mediators, particularly Egypt, that Israel opposes Hamas remaining in any governing or military capacity in post-war Gaza.

The third objective was to create intense military pressure, coordinated with the U.S., on all remaining elements of the Shiite “axis of resistance,” including Yemen’s Houthis, Hamas, and Iran.