From 66 to 74 CE, and again from 132 to 136, Jews revolted against Roman rule. In both uprisings, surprising initial success gave way to catastrophic defeat. Robert Silverman explains how the leaders of these rebellions created what he dubs an “information campaign,” preserved most notably in the coins minted by the revolutionary governments, and how these campaigns shaped the Zionist movement:

The coins were minted by a central authority—probably the Temple staff in the First Revolt and [the rebel leader] Shimon ben Kosiba’s headquarters in the Second Revolt—who kept the quality control and die engraving at a high level throughout the revolts. These were organized governments that devised “hearts and minds” information campaigns using the best mass media of the time—coins.

The legends on the coins are inscribed in a script, paleo-Hebrew, that was no longer in daily use at the time of the revolts. Using this antique script was part of the information campaign to identify the revolts with earlier periods of Jewish sovereignty. Even if only scribes could read them, the coins bear compact powerful messages that could be orally transmitted. The rebels lived in a linguistically diverse part of the Roman empire where Aramaic and Greek predominated. But they insisted on Hebrew as the language of their state. Their coin inscriptions are only in Hebrew.

The coins from both revolts proclaim the name of the newly independent Jewish state—Israel. But at the time of the revolts, there had been no political entity of this name for over 600 years. . . . By invoking Israel in their information campaign, the rebels sought to turn a local rebellion in one Roman province into an international war by recruiting all of the Jews, especially those in the Parthian empire, Rome’s chief enemy. Perhaps they realized that this was the only way to secure independence.

In the second part of his analysis, Silverman looks at the rebels’ use of the term ḥerut, which originally meant freedom from slavery:

The rebels enlarged the concept of ḥerut to mean the collective political independence of the nation. Bronze coins of the First Revolt proclaim “Year 2 of the independence of Zion” while those of the Second Revolt say “Year 2 of the independence of Israel.” These are the most common revolt coins. . . . For the rebels, the concepts of the personal freedom of individual Jews and the political independence of the nation were intertwined, as they would later be in the minds of modern Zionists.

In the absence of a commission of inquiry, Israelis are drawing their own conclusions about October 7. A great number believe that the mistake lay in taking a defensive posture toward Hamas, and that the obvious lesson is that Hizballah should be preempted before it attempts an even more terrible attack on Israel’s north. At the same time, Israel’s war-weary citizen-soldiers and their families have little appetite for more fighting, even if they fear it may be necessary. Hizballah, for its part, fired a missile on Friday night that struck on Israeli barn and killed two horses. And yesterday, it launched a drone attack that left eighteen soldiers wounded.

The U.S., meanwhile, appears desperate to avoid a showdown in Lebanon. Hal Brands argues that the White House might be able to prevent one, if it takes a very different tack:

The key is ruthless coercive diplomacy. Hizballah is more likely to pull back, and Iran is more likely to counsel retrenchment, if they are convinced that America will aid Israel resolutely.

Biden must make clear that he will give Israel the time and resources it needs to decimate Hizballah—that there will be no early calls for a cease-fire, and that American bombs and bullets will flow. He should make clear, moreover, that Washington will inflict crushing punishment on Iran if Iran enters the conflict—as a way of convincing Hizballah that if it fights, it fights alone.

Unfortunately, the administration’s body language signals something different—a transparent, almost desperate desire for calm in the run-up to a crucial presidential vote. When Iran attacked Israel in April, for instance, the U.S.—after organizing a successful defense against Tehran’s drones and missiles—pivoted immediately to restraining the Israeli response.

As the risks in the Middle East rise, helping Israel make a credible threat of war may be the price of convincing Hizballah and Iran that they should swerve to avoid it.