On a remote hilltop in the Judean desert stands a fortress from the 2nd century BCE known as Hyrcania. While its location has long been known, it until now has never been excavated. Uri Shapira writes:

“The archaeological significance of the site is tremendous. Unearthing the evidence, it’s something that overwhelms us” said Michal Haber, one of the archaeologists who led the excavations.

Hyrcania is mentioned in Josephus’ book Antiquities of the Jews as one of the three fortresses that queen Salome Alexandra, wife of Alexander Janneaus (the second Hasmonean king, who ruled the land during the 1st century BCE), refused to give up to the Pharisee party. Later, the site was associated with the famous king Herod the Great. It was known as the place where the Roman-appointed king of Judea imprisoned and tortured his rivals. The fortress is also linked to the copper scroll, one of the famous Dead Sea scrolls, which contains instructions about a mysterious treasure.

“We assume that the treasures which are mentioned in the scroll are the treasures of the Temple. The late archaeologist Hanan Eshel suggested that they are also treasures from the First Temple era,” [the excavation’s director], Oren Gutfeld, said.

[Taking] part in the digging is the American Veterans Archaeological Recovery, an organization that helps war veterans facing challenges in their life.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.